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     ABSTRACT
DAVID FRAGOSO GONZALEZ: Essays on Applied Information Economics 
Theory.
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
This dissertation contains two essays on applied microeconomic theory, each addressing
situations of asymmetric information between economic agents. The first essay develops a the-
oretical model to illustrate how a short-termist board with positive inside information can use
disclosed executive compensation to credibly signal its optimism to the less informed outsiders
pricing the company’s stock. The board uses the fact that performance based pay is more
valuable to the executive when prospects are good to give her a compensation package that
she would not accept if the inside information were bad. Signaling does not always distort
compensation packages away from optimal incentive provision; when it does, the distortion is
magnified if the moral hazard in the agency relation between board and executive is large, the
executive’s contribution to company performance is relatively unimportant, the company’s op-
erations are relatively risky, and the enforcement of disclosure rules is weak. By outlining some
conditions in which compensation is likely to be used as a signal and characterizing the distor-
tions that such use induces in different circumstances, this paper proposes new explanations
for the observed heterogeneity in compensation practices.
The second essay develops a new theory of the organization of the financial audit market
to explain the observed variation in market concentration across market segments. It provides
a micro-founded model of audit demand whereby audit clients enjoy network benefits from
having other clients audited by their auditor. Using two versions of the model, and under
the assumption of diseconomies of scale in the audit sector, the essay derives two alternative
explanations for audit market outcomes. The first is that, because they value the network
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benefits from auditing more highly, client companies in which informational asymmetries are
more severe retain auditors with more clients. The second is that, because they generate a
larger network effect, companies in which accounting errors are more likely to become public
are also audited by larger auditors. The hypotheses behind these explanations are that the
visibility of a company and the severity of information asymmetries are correlated with size
and ownership type.
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CHAPTER 1: A THEORY OF DISCLOSED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AS A 
SIGNAL OF INSIDE INFORMATION
1.1 Introduction
As corporate insiders, the members of a company’s board - which typically includes a few of the
company’s executives - are often better informed about their company’s future prospects than
the outsiders that finance it and price its stock1. As representatives of current stockholders’
interests, board members are also often motivated to influence how outsiders perceive those
prospects. This is true when the company issues securities - during an I.P.O., a bond issue,
or a new stock issue - or when the company’s stockholders have a short-term position in the
company. When motivated to influence outsiders, board members must solve the “corporate
signaling problem” (CSP): how to credibly signal optimism given that purporting it is beneficial
even when non-existent.
This paper develops a theoretical model in which publicly disclosed executive compensation
is a credible signaling device. The purpose of the model is to help advance the understanding
of the following questions: Under what conditions is executive compensation available as a
signal? How does the signaling intent affect compensation practices (and hence accounts for
heterogeneity in them)? Under which circumstances is executive compensation likely to be
used as a signal? This introduction will explain how the model’s assumptions and conclusions
help us address these questions. Before, however, it must explain the intuition behind the idea
of executive compensation as a signal and provide a basic overview of how that idea is modeled.
In the model, the board engages in two relationships: one of agency with the executive,
and one of signaling with outsiders that gives rise to the CSP. The CSP is modeled through
1For an overview of some of the evidence supporting the hypothesis of asymmetric access to information
between the insiders of a company and the outsiders pricing its securities see Tirole (2006).
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the inclusion of two assumptions: first, that boards have soft, or unverifiable, private infor-
mation that outsiders lack and, crucially, that such information is common knowledge with
the executive; second, that the board maximizes short-term stock prices - set in a competitive
stock market composed by outsiders - with short-term being some moment before the public
unraveling of the board’s private information.
In the context of the model, the fact that allows executive compensation to solve the CSP is
that optimistic executives are more willing to accept packages with less guaranteed pay, which
comes in the form of instruments like salary and perks, and more performance-based pay, which
comes in the form of bonuses and equity based instruments like stock grants and options, than
pessimist ones. An optimistic board can then signal its optimism by offering the executive a
package that, given her alternative employment opportunities, she would not be able to accept
if she were less optimistic.
The last sentence conveys the basic reasoning as to why executive compensation can serve
as signal, but does so somewhat imprecisely. This is why: if a compensation package that a
pessimist executive would never accept outright leads outsiders to infer that the company’s
prospects are good, then a pessimistic board may be tempted to “bribe” its executive into
accepting such a package by giving her additional compensation without disclosing so to the
public. To credibly signal optimist, the board must therefore account for the possibility of a
bribe and make its offer unprofitable. Note that, the more pessimistic the executive is, the
more it will cost the board to convince the executive to accept a package heavy in variable pay
and light in fixed pay. To put it more technically, the cost of signaling is negatively correlated
with the value of the information being signaled. As first observed by Spence (1973) in his
seminal work on signaling, this condition of negative correlation between the information being
signaled and the cost of signaling it is sufficient to ensure that the proposed signaling device is
effective.
With the basic intuition behind this paper’s argument as to why executive compensation
can solve the CSP now exposed, we can go back to the discussion of how the paper contributes
to answering its guiding questions.
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Under what circumstances is executive compensation available as a signal?
The model does not characterize all the circumstances under which executive compensation
can be used as a signal, and so cannot give a definitive answer to this question. However,
by showing that executive compensation is a viable signal under particular assumptions, it
suggests a partial one, based precisely on those assumptions.
It was previously remarked that, in the model, a board signals optimism by connecting
the executive’s pay to future performance in a way that a pessimistic executive would find
unacceptable. This conclusion is made possible by two implicit assumptions. The first as-
sumption concerns executive compensation regulation: for the model to apply it must not be
possible to undo, through undisclosed means, the connection between the executive’s pay and
the company’s performance. That is, there must be rules in place to prevent the executive from
secretly short-selling the company or engaging in secret trading with the company or a third
party and protect herself from the risk associated with her compensation package. In reality,
there is a class of companies subject to such rules: those that are publicly listed or in the
process of being listed (going through IPOs). In the United States, for example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces rules limiting secret trading and short-selling by
executives. The SEC also enforces compensation disclosure rules, that constraint companies
from awarding undisclosed compensation. This need for rules on secret trading and disclosure
practices seemingly discards private companies as potential users of executive compensation as
a signal.
The second assumption concerns the outsiders’ understanding of the market for the execu-
tive’s labor. For an outsider to determine that an accepted package would be unacceptable to
a pessimistic executive, he must have some knowledge about the market value of the executive.
That is, for the model to apply, outsiders must have a good understanding of the executive’s
value. The extent to which they do is likely to vary across firms and industries.
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How does the use of executive compensation for signaling affect compensation
practices?
The model works within the boundaries of the classical principal-agent approach to executive
compensation in that the board sets executive pay not just to signal information but also
to correct the moral hazard in the executive’s actions. As in other works in the classical
mold (which started with Jensen and Meckling (1976)), moral hazard is modeled through the
assumption that the executive must exert unobservable effort at a personal cost. This means
that, absent a signaling motive, we have a textbook moral hazard model in which the board
awards performance-based pay to motivate the executive to exert effort.
As already mentioned, to fulfill its signaling goal, an optimistic board must eliminate the
temptation that a pessimistic board may have to secretly bribe the executive into accepting a
package signaling good news. This need to suppress the board’s temptation to bribe holds even
though, as suggested in the previous subsection, the companies that can use compensation as
a signal are those that are subject to rules requiring all compensation to be disclosed. This is
because disclosure rules apply to (or can be more easily enforced when dealing with) standard
instruments of compensation, like cash, equity-based compensation, or monetary retirement
benefits (and, at least in the U.S., and with particular emphasis since 2006, to perquisites like
airplane use as well), not to less evident forms of compensation, like state of the art offices,
the ability to recruit friends to work for the company, the sponsoring of the executive’s pet
projects (like charities and foundations), or non-pecuniary post-retirement benefits2. While
these forms of compensation may be used for a variety of other reasons, their existence gives
boards an instrument with which to secretly pay their executives, even if it is a costly one3.
2Tirole (2006) provides an example of non-pecuniary retirement benefits that were not disclosed to stockhold-
ers at the time of its grant: “Unbeknownst to outsiders, [Jack Welsh’s] retirement package included continued
access to private jets, a luxurious apartment in Manhattan, memberships of exclusive clubs, access to restau-
rants, and so forth.” Tirole also documents instances of nepotism and of attribution of undisclosed perks.
3The impossibility to convert most instruments of secret compensation into money means that these instru-
ments ares likely to hold less value to the executive than what it costs the company to provide them.
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The analysis of the model shows that there is a signaling equilibrium, and that this equilib-
rium is unique4. In some cases, boards signal optimism “for free” by offering the package that
addresses moral hazard optimally. This is the case when moral hazard in the agency relation
between board and executive is small the executive’s contribution to company performance is
important, the company’s operations are relatively safe or the executive is not too averse to
risk. In other words, free signaling is possible when the optimal moral hazard solving package
prescribes that the executive’s pay should be largely attached to the company’s future per-
formance. Free signaling is also possible when the value of undisclosed compensation to the
executive is low relative to what it costs the board to provide it.
When these conditions are not present, however, signaling distorts the provision of incen-
tives. The distortions are magnified as the conditions move in the opposite direction towards:
significant moral hazard in the agency relation between board and executive; the executive’s
contribution to company performance being relatively unimportant, the company’s operations
being risky, and a high valuation by the executive of undisclosed forms of compensation.
The paper’s equilibrium predictions thus propose different sources of heterogeneity for ob-
served compensation: the first source is the nature of inside information (equilibrium packages
change according to the insiders’ confidence); the other sources are the idiosyncratic features
of the company and of the executive discussed above. All of this, however, is contingent on
executive compensation being used for signaling, which brings us to the next question.
Under which circumstances is executive compensation likely to be used as a signal?
Over the years, what I have here labeled as the CSP has received some attention in the fi-
nance literature. As a consequence, dividend policies (starting with Bhattacharya (1979)),
debt/equity ratios (starting with Ross (1977)), and stock splits (starting with Grinblatt et al.
(1984)), the stakes retained by entrepreneurs in their own projects (starting with Leland and
Pyle (1977)), and executive compensation (starting with Hayes and Schaefer (2009) and now
4The uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the application of a refinement - the intuitive criterion -
that discards “implausible” equilibria.
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with the present work) have all been cast as signals of insider information.
On a first take, the plurality of signals would seem to indicate that boards are only likely
to use executive compensation as a signal when compensation is the most cost effective in the
pool of corporate signaling devices. A closer look, though, reveals that the signals in this pool
all seem to share a common trait: they are not systematically available. A company cannot
split stock, announce a new dividend policy, or change the way it compensates executive every
time new information is generated. Therefore, it is likely that at most points in time, a board
wishing to signal information may not have any credible devices with which to do so. Therefore,
every time any of the devices in the pool is available to a board facing the CSP, it is probably
going to be used. The relevant question is then: in what circumstances is the CSP modeled in
the paper likely to arise in reality?
One of the cornerstones of the CSP is the assumption of asymmetric unverifiable information
between the board and the executive on one side, and the outsiders on the other. As already
mentioned, the existence of asymmetric information is supported empirically. Moreover, it has
an intuitive explanation: board members and executives owe their positions to their expertise
in the company’s activities; this expertise puts them in a position to interpret hard information
- that can and, sometimes, by virtue of the disclosure rules affecting public companies and IPO
candidates, must be disclosed to the public - in a way that outsiders cannot.
The other cornerstone of the CSP at the heart of this paper is the assumption that the
board’s goal is to maximize short-term stock prices5. In the case of IPO candidates, the short-
term motivation is obviously present: a higher initial price allows the company to obtain more
capital, enhances the reputations of all parties involved, and allows the initial investors - who
are likely to be heavily represented in the board - to cash in on their holdings and move on to
new projects.
In the case of already listed companies, the short-term motivation is also likely to be present,
at least in some cases. Using data from Froot et al. (1992), Bolton et al. (2006) estimate that
“the effective horizon of institutional investors (...) is about 1 year.” Because institutional
5Short-termism is also the motive assigned to signal-senders in other research on the CSP. Examples include
(Ross, 1977), Bhattacharya (1979), and Grinblatt et al. (1984).
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investors appoint most of the board members, their short-term orientation is likely to be a
significant factor in board members’ decisions.
The answer to this subsection’s question is thus that, if available as such, executive compen-
sation is likely to be used as signal by any public company where there is substantial generation
of inside information and where the board is responsive to the impatience of its stockholders.
We thus have that the model predicts that stockholder impatience and influence are sources of
heterogeneity in executive compensation practices.
In sum, if this paper’s theory has any merit, we should expect IPO candidates and at
least some publicly listed companies (those with a short-term inclination) to approach the
negotiation over their executives’ compensation with a signaling intent. Moreover, given the
model’s unique equilibrium prediction that the disclosure of compensation is always informative
when the company has a signaling intent, we should expect stock prices to react positively to
the announcement of packages whereby the executive’s pay depends strongly upon performance.
Certo et al. (2003) obtain “partial support” for this hypothesis in their study of the case of IPO
candidates by using CEO stock options as a measure of performance-based pay. Unfortunately,
no other empirical works address it.
The rest of the paper goes on as follows. Section 1.2 places this paper in the two literatures
to which it is related. Section 1.3 introduces the multilateral model behind the paper’s signaling
theory of executive compensation. Section 1.4 analyzes the basic version of that model, whereby
the insiders’ private information is binary, and section 1.5 extends this analysis to a model where
private information is drawn from a continuous interval. The comparative statics are discussed
an interpreted in section 1.6. The conclusion outlines ideas for future research.
1.2 Literature
This paper stands in the intersection between the executive compensation literature and the
corporate signaling literature. This section explains the paper’s relation with other papers in
that intersection, and also with key contributions to either of the two literatures.
At least two other papers address the signaling function of executive compensation from a
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theoretical standpoint. Lund (2012) dismisses incentive provision and puts forth the hypothesis
that observed compensation practices reflect two signaling goals: to convey governance quality
and, as in the present paper, to betray the executive’s optimism or pessimism about the
company’s future. This paper’s approach differs from Lund’s in three ways. First, it considers
incentive provision in tandem with signaling as the forces that shape compensation practices.
Second, it acknowledges the incentives of pessimistic boards to mimic the behavior of optimistic
ones and the channel through which they can do it: by bribing the executive with undisclosed
compensation. And third, it studies the signaling role of executive compensation with a game
theoretical model.
Hayes and Schaefer (2009) also employ a game theoretical approach to study executive
compensation as signaling, but they do so to address a different question: they ask whether it
is possible to explain the documented rise in CEO pay over the last decades with the existence
of a “Lake Wobegon Effect”, whereby boards do not want to admit to having a below average
CEO and hence try to signal her value by awarding her more compensation than what her
retention would warrant. In their treatment, the information being signaled concerns only the
CEO’s match with the firm. Moreover, signaling is performed through fixed compensation,
as pay cannot be attached to performance and there is no agency problem warranting the
provision of incentives.
A few papers in the corporate signaling literature have considered the CSP created when
the signal-sender is driven by short-termist motivations6. The devices considered as solutions
to the signaling problem include dividend policies (Bhattacharya (1979), Bhattacharya (1980),
and Miller and Rock (1985)), the allocation of the company’s financing between debt and
equity (Ross (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984)), and stock splits (Grinblatt et al. (1984)
and Mcnichols and Dravid (1990)).
While the nature of their signaling problem is different - they consider an entrepreneur
looking for lenders who can finance her venture - Leland and Pyle (1977) have one of closest
6This section does not intend to be an exhaustive survey of the corporate signaling literature, and therefore
focuses only on contributions addressing the same problem or containing similar arguments to the one made
here. For a broader review of this literature, see Tirole (2006).
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arguments to that presented in this paper. They propose that entrepreneurs signal their con-
fidence in the future future performance of their venture by foregoing a larger diversification
of their investment portfolio, thus keeping a larger stake in their venture than optimal risk
considerations would recommend.
As already mentioned in the introduction, this paper takes a classical approach to executive
compensation, as it assigns to performance based pay the role of diluting the moral hazard in
the agency relationship between stockholders and executives. In this sense it follows the lead
of works like Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), Holmstrom
(1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), and Bolton et al. (2006)7. Moreover, it borrows a
popular modeling tool from some of these papers: the assumption of linear compensation
schemes, normally distributed future profits, and mean-variance preferences for the executive.
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) present the textbook version of the principal-agent model with
these assumptions, while Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Bolton et al. (2006) present applied
versions of it.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Description
The model features three types of agent connected by their relation to the same company: a
board, an executive, and a mass of homogenous outsiders making up for a perfectly competitive
demand for the company’s stock.
Acton unfolds according to the timeline in figure 1.1. In keeping with the standard timeline
in the corporate signaling literature, the model has three stages. From the perspective of the
initial stage, 0, these stages are the present (0), the short-term, (1), and the long-term (2).
In stage 0 board and executive jointly acquire private information about the long-term
(stage 2) profits (gross of executive compensation) of the company. The board then offers
a compensation package to the executive. If the executive accepts the package, the board
7The literature on moral hazard in general agency relationships is extensive. Here, I only mention references
focusing exclusively on managerial moral hazard.
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Board and executive bargain over 
compensation in light of shared 
private info; board publishes 
disclosure about agreed terms; 
executive makes managerial 
decisions
Outsiders set stock 
price in light of 
compensation 
disclosure 
t=0 (now) t=1 (short-term) t=2 (long-term)
Profit is realized; 
accrues to current 
stockholders who 
pay executive 
according to 
disclosed terms
Figure 1.1: The timeline of the model
makes a public disclosure about it and the executive begins her employment, which entails
the exertion of managerial effort. In stage 1 the outsiders bid for the company’s stock with
disclosed compensation as their only information. In stage 2 profits are realized, the executive
is paid according to the terms of her package, and net profits accrue to the new stockholders.
The board approaches the setting of executive compensation motivated by its full internal-
ization of the goals of the non-modeled initial stockholders of the company, who wish to sell
the company in the short term (stage 1)8.The board therefore sets executive compensation in
stage 0 to maximize the price of the company’s at stage 1 net of executive compensation costs
incurred until the moment of the sale. The stock’s price will be larger the more the outsiders
are convinced that the state of the company is good and herein lies the corporate signaling
problem at the core of this paper.
The informal description of the model makes clear that it contains two relationships: the
first is of agency between the board (the principal) and the executive (the agent); the other
of signaling in the market for the company’s stock between the board (the sender) and the
outsiders (the receivers). The next two subsections introduce the model formally by sequentially
addressing each relationship.
1.3.1.1 Agency within the Company
In stage 0 the board and the executive jointly observe the company’s state θ ∈ Θ (which affects
the company’s profit). Outsiders do not observe θ but hold the correct prior belief pθ for all
8Stage 1 can be interpreted as the date of an IPO or of a common stock issue, or simply the moment
in which the stockholders’ short-term interest in the company expires because of liquidity needs or optimal
portfolio considerations.
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θ ∈ Θ. pθ is a probability if the state space Θ is discrete and a probability density function if Θ
is continuous. The initial analysis is based on the two state version of the model, as it allows for
a quicker, and less technical, characterization of the signaling role of executive compensation9.
Let the state space then be Θ =
{
0, θ¯
}
, where θ¯ > 0 is the “good” state and 0 the “bad”
state, and define p ≡ pθ¯.
After the two insiders observe θ the board offers the executive a compensation package C.
If the executive accepts the job, she is charged with a single managerial task: the exertion of
costly effort e in stage 0. State and effort affect the stochastic gross profit pi (θ, e) that the
company yields in stage 2 and which is given by:
pi (θ, e) = θ + µe+ η (1.1)
where η ∼ N (0, σ2) is normally distributed and µ is the marginal value of managerial effort.
A compensation package C includes three elements. Two are publicly observed: they are
the wage w and the share in the company’s gross profit b. The other is unobservable: the
undisclosed fixed compensation k10. The two observable elements are paid to the executive in
stage 2, the unobservable element is paid in stage 0. Formally, compensation package C is a
triple11
C ≡ (w, b, k) ∈ ΩC≡ R× [0, 1]× R+.
Disclosed compensation is a pair
D ≡ (w, b) ∈ R× [0, 1] ≡ ΩD.
9Section 1.5 tackles the case in which Θ is a bounded continuous interval.
10As mentioned in the introduction, undisclosed compensation comes in the form of benefits that do not fit
standard definitions of compensation, and therefore can be awarded without subjecting the company to charges
of non-compliance with insider trading and disclosure rules. The fact that undisclosed compensation must take
non-standard forms also implies that it cannot be made contingent on performance, which is why the model
only has fixed undisclosed compensation.
While hidden forms of compensation may serve different purposes in reality, here they serve as tool with
which companies can bribe their executives into accepting disclosed terms that displease them.
11The assumption that b’s domain is [0, 1] reflects the notion that the executive cannot own more than 100%
of the company nor own a short position in it.
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In game theoretical terms, a strategy by the board entails the selection of a compensation
package in stage 0 in every possible state. Notationally, a strategy by the board is represented as
sBd ≡ (Cθ)θ∈Θ = (wθ, bθ, kθ)θ∈Θ. In every state, the board selects the package that maximizes
the price of the company’s stock in stage 1 net of compensation costs expensed in stage 0. That
is, if we let q1 denote the sale price of the company in stage 1, the board maximizes q1−k. This
assumption about the board’s preferences synthesizes two deeper assumptions: first, that the
board internalizes the preferences of unmodeled initial stockholders; second, that these initial
stockholders are short-termist risk-neutral agents who want to sell the company in stage 1.
A strategy by the executive entails deciding whether to accept or reject any package C ∈ ΩC
in every possible state, as well as selecting a level of effort for every package in every state.
Notationally, a strategy by the executive is represented as sEx = (δθC , eθC)θ∈Θ,C∈ΩC , where
δθC ∈ {Y,N} is her decision to accept or reject package C in state θ, and eθC is her effort
contingent on having accepted package C when in state θ.
If the executive rejects the board’s offer, she earns a reservation expected utility of u¯ by
taking on her next best employment opportunity. If the executive accepts the board’s offer of
C and decides to exert a level of effort of e when the state of the company is θ, she obtains an
expected income given by
E (I|θ;C, e) = w + αk + bE [pi (θ, e) |θ] (1.2)
where α (such that 0 ≤ α < 1) represents the value attached by the executive to every dollar
spent by the board in undisclosed compensation12. Expected income enters the executive’s
utility linearly: given the state of the company, the executive’s preferences are represented by
the CARA mean-variance utility function
EuEx−θ (C, e) = E (I|θ;C, e)− γ
2
var(I|C)− ψ
2
e2 (1.3)
12The fact that a dollar spent by the board in undisclosed compensation is worth less to the executive than
a dollar in salary follows from the very nature of undisclosed compensation. Since it must be awarded through
non-standard forms that cannot be easily converted to cash, undisclosed compensation is unlikely to be worth
as much as cash. Moreover, the value of undisclosed compensation is likely to depend upon the ability of the
regulator to monitor the company, and upon the idiosyncrasies of the company.
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in which γ, ψ > 0 measure the executive’s aversion to risk and effort, respectively.
The assumption that compensation is linear in the profits of the company is common in
effort based models of managerial compensation. (See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for
a discussion and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Bolton et al. (2006) for examples of its
application.) It is used in combination with the mean-variance utility function of the executive
and the normal distribution of profits to circumvent the technical difficulties associated with
trying to find general optimal compensation schemes, as it allows for closed form solutions.
Moreover, linear contracts, with their fixed and variable components, bear some resemblance
to typical executive contracts.
1.3.1.2 Signaling to the Stock Market
The asymmetry of information between board and prospective stock buyers means that vari-
ables controlled by the board and observable to the buyers will used by the latter as information,
making them signaling devices. In this model, the only variable that is set by the board and
observed by the buyers is disclosed compensation D.
Aware that prospective buyers will use disclosed compensation to make inferences about the
company’s state, and given its objective of maximizing q1−k (stock prices net of compensation
costs expensed in period 0 ), the board has an incentive to set D as to induce optimistic beliefs,
regardless of the true state of the company.
Upon observing D, the prospective buyers update their beliefs about the state of the com-
pany and, therefore, their valuation of the company’s stock. Formally, the outsiders’ updated
beliefs after they observe the disclosure of package D are denoted as ρ (D) ≡ (ρ (θ|D; s))θ∈Θ - in
which ρ (θ|D; s) is the probability assigned by the prospective buyers to the company’s state be-
ing θ given their observation of D and their belief that a strategy profile s = (sBd,sEx) is being
played by the other players. A fully specified system of beliefs is denoted as ρ = (ρ (D))D∈ΩD .
The prospective buyers are homogenous, risk-neutral, and numerous (which ensures perfect
competition in the market for the company’s stock). Combined, these assumptions imply that
the equilibrium stock price in period 1, q?1 (D; s), must be equal to the outsiders’ assessment of
the company’s expected gross profit net of executive compensation given their observation of
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package D and their belief that the other players are behaving according to strategy profile s.
That is, q?1 (D; s) must be given by
q?1 (D; s) =
ˆ
θ∈Θ
{(θ + µeθC) (1− b)− w} ρ (θ|D; s) dθ (1.4)
which, in the two state version of the model, boils down to
q?1 (D; s) =
[
θ¯ρ
(
θ¯|D; s)+ µeθC] (1− b)− w (1.5)
The expressions reveal the three channels through which disclosed executive compensation
affects stock prices: first, the observation of D allows outsiders to observe the executive com-
pensation costs that the final (stage 2) owners of the company will bear; second, it lets the
outsiders infer the executive’s effort; and third, it informs the outsiders’ beliefs.
Given a strategy profile s and a belief system ρ, the board’s payoff expected payoff from
offering package C in state θ is then given by:
EuBd−θ (C; s, ρ) = q?1 (D; s)− k (1.6)
The expression makes clear that compensation package C affects the board’s payoff in two
ways: directly trough k, and indirectly through the three channels by which D affects the stock
price.
With the formal description of the players’ preferences and actions complete, only one
ingredient is missing from the model: an equilibrium concept. The next subsection provides
one.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Concept
Equilibrium is defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that satisfies the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). This refinement discards PBE that contain implausible
beliefs in off-the-equilibrium paths. Formally:
Definition 1. A profile of strategies and a system of beliefs (s?; ρ?) is an equilibrium of this
game if:
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1. it is a PBE:
(a) Given his/her beliefs and the equilibrium strategies of his/her opponents, no player
finds it profitable to deviate from s? once any of his/her information sets (on and
off the equilibrium path) is reached;
(b) The system of beliefs ρ? of the prospective buyers is derived from strategy profile s
through Bayes’ rule whenever possible. That is,
ρ? (θ|D?; s?) = Pr [θ|D?; s?] = Pr [D
?|θ; s?] pθ´
θ′∈Θ Pr [D
?|θ′; s?] pθ′dθ′
2. it passes the intuitive criterion. That is, there cannot be a state θ in which the board
would surely have in Ddev a profitable deviation if only the prospective buyers’ beliefs
assigned zero probability to the state of the company being any θ˜ such that, for any beliefs
afterDdev, it is true that EuBd−θ˜
(
Cdev; s, ρ
)
= q?1
(
Ddev; s?
)−kdev < EuBd−θ˜ (C?; s, ρ) =
q?1 (D
?; s?)− k?.
The intuitive criterion thus discards PBE in which prospective buyers would hold beliefs
that fail to recognize credible signaling attempts by the board off the equilibrium path.
The next section applies this equilibrium concept to the two state model, while the section
after does the same to the continuous state model.
1.4 Analysis
As customary in dynamic games, I start by analyzing the last strategic decision of the game
and then move backwards in time.
The last decision belongs to the prospective buyers who compete in period 1 for the owner-
ship of the company. As first argued in subsection 1.3.1.2, the equilibrium price of the company
that results from this competition is, in the two state model, given by:
q?1 (D; s) =
[
θ¯ρ
(
θ¯|D; s)+ µeθC] (1− b)− w
In equilibrium, the buyers correctly guess the strategies being followed by the other players
and update beliefs by using the on and off equilibrium path rules provided in definition 1.
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The second to last decision in the model belongs to the executive: contingent on having
accepted a compensation package, she must decide how much effort to exert. In equilibrium,
she selects the amount of effort that maximizes her expected utility given the state of the
company and the terms of her compensation. That is, she solves the following maximization
problem:
max
e∈R+
EuEx−θ(C, e) = max
x∈[0,1]
{
w + αk + b (θ + µe)− γ
2
(bσ)2 − ψ
2
e2
}
. (1.7)
The first order condition of this problem yields the executive’s optimal effort
e?θC = e
?
C = b
µ
ψ
∀θ ∈ Θ (1.8)
which does not directly depend upon the state of the company, but may be affected by it
indirectly if the executive’s stake varies with the state of the company.
The executive has her optimal effort selection rule in mind when she takes the decision that
precedes effort exertion: whether to accept or reject the compensation package that the board
proposes. In equilibrium, the executive accepts package C = (w, b, k) if it is rational to do so.
By exerting the optimal amount of effort e?θC under C, she must obtain an expected utility
that is no less than the utility yielded by her alternative employment option. This condition
of individual rationality is denoted as:
IREx−θ : EuEx−θ(C, e?C) = w + αk + b
(
θ + b
µ2
ψ
)
− γ
2
(bσ)2 − ψ
2
(
b
µ
ψ
)2
≥ u¯ (1.9)
In sum, the equilibrium strategy of the executive is s?Ex = (δ
?
θC , e
?
C)θ∈Θ,C∈ΩC where δ
?
θC = Y
if EuEx−θ(C, e?C) ≥ u¯ and δ?θC = N otherwise.
The derivation of the executive’s equilibrium strategy leaves only one decision to be char-
acterized: the board’s offer of a package. Subsection 1.4.2 does this characterization. Before
we get there, subsection 1.4.1 derives a useful benchmark by solving the model with symmetric
information.
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1.4.1 Symmetric Information
The signaling function of disclosed compensation is lost if the buyers can observe the state of
the company. Therefore, the compensation package that maximizes the price of the company
in period 1 net of undisclosed compensation is the package that maximizes gross profit net of
undisclosed and disclosed compensation costs. The symmetric information model is similar to
the textbook model of effort exertion with normally distributed profits, linear compensation
packages and mean-variance preferences for which Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) provide a
solution. The only difference is that here there are two forms of fixed compensation, w and k,
instead of one.
The problem that the board solves in each state, with the optimal effort provision rule
e?C =
bµ
ψ already plugged in, is:
maxC∈ΩC
(
θ + bµ
2
ψ
)
(1− b)− w − k
s.t. : IREx−θ : w + αk + b
(
θ + bµ
2
ψ
)
− γ2 (bσ)2 − ψ2
(
b µψ
)2 ≥ u¯. (1.10)
Proposition 1 offers the solution to this problem. Throughout the paper, this solution will
be referred to as the solution to the symmetric case or the first-best solution13.
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium of the symmetric information case, the board offers
compensation package CSIθ to the executive when in state θ such that:
bSIθ =
µ2
µ2 + ψγσ2
wSIθ = u¯− bSI
(
θ + bSI
µ2
ψ
)
+
γ
2
(
bSIσ
)2
+
ψ
2
(
bSI
µ
ψ
)2
kSIθ = 0.
13The solution is first-best in the sense that it is not distorted by signaling. It is, however, distorted by moral
hazard.
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Given CSIθ , the executive exerts effort
eSI =
µ3
ψµ2 + ψ2γσ2
.
Proof. First observe that the constraint must bind; otherwise the board would find it profitable
to decrease w. The stake in profits bSIθ can then be found by taking the first-order condition
of the problem with respect to b. Since it is more expensive to reward the executive through
k than through w, and k cannot be negative, we have that kSIθ = 0. The expression for w
SI
θ
follows from solving the binding constraint with respect to w. The executive’s equilibrium
effort is found by substituting the expression of bSI in the optimal effort exertion rule.
We thus have that in the symmetric information case, the executive’s stake in the firm’s
profits is independent of the state. The next subsection shows that the same may not be true
when information is asymmetric.
1.4.2 Asymmetric Information
A pure strategy by the board specifies the compensation package that is offered in each state.
A strategy is then an object sBd = (C0, Cθ¯). To determine which strategies can be sustained in
equilibrium, it is convenient to separately consider pooling and separating strategies. The two
kinds of strategy differ in terms of their prescriptions for the part of the compensation package
that can be observed by outsiders, D = (w, b). A pooling strategy prescribes the same disclosed
compensation terms in each state (D0 = Dθ¯), which makes disclosed compensation uninfor-
mative about the state of the company. A separating strategy prescribes different disclosed
compensation terms for each state ( D0 6= Dθ¯), which allows outsiders to fully infer the state of
the company from their observation of disclosed compensation. For executive compensation to
be a solution to the corporate signaling problem outlined in this paper, a separating strategy
must be supported in equilibrium.
The following two sub-subsections study whether either kind of strategy can be sustained
in equilibrium.
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1.4.2.1 Separating Strategies
When the board follows a separating strategy, stock prices fully reflect the value of the com-
pany’s stock. This is beneficial to the board if the state is good, but detrimental if it is not,
and therefore can only be sustained if the optimistic board can prevent the pessimist board
from purporting optimism. In other words, for a separating strategy prescribing compensation
packages Dθ¯ and D0 to be supported in equilibrium, the board must design Dθ¯ as to make it
sufficiently costly to offer in the bad state.
I begin the search for a separating equilibrium by conjecturing that at least one separating
strategy, ssepBd =
(
Csep0 , C
sep
θ¯
)
, is indeed supported in equilibrium. By the end of this sub-
section, I will have shown that the conjecture is true and that ssepBd is the only separating
strategy that is supported in equilibrium. I will also have derived a closed form solution for
each of its elements.
Denote by ssep =
(
ssepBd , s
?
Ex
)
, where s?Ex is the previously derived equilibrium strategy of
the executive, the equilibrium strategy profile that includes ssepBd . On the path that follows from
the implementation of ssep, the prospective buyers of the company are able to perfectly infer
its state from their observation of the disclosed portion of the compensation package. It follows
that the equilibrium package offered in the bad state, Csep0 , must be the same as the first-best
package CSI0 . As the solution to the symmetric information case, CSI0 has already been shown
to be the best package under the very worst beliefs. The conclusion that Csep0 = C
SI
0 is formally
stated and proved in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. In any separating equilibrium, the board offers compensation package Csep0 =
(wsep0 , b
sep
0 , k
sep
0 ) = C
SI
0 when the state of the company is bad.
Proof. Suppose instead that a package Cˆ0 =
(
wˆ0, bˆ0, kˆ0
)
6= CSI0 could be supported as part of
a proposed equilibrium strategy sˆBd. The observation of the disclosed part Dˆ0 =
(
wˆ0, bˆ0
)
would induce the belief ρˆ
(
θ¯|Dsep0 ; ssep
)
= 0 and the payoff of the board would then be
EuBd−0
(
Cˆ0; sˆBd, s
?
Ex, ρˆ
)
= q?1
(
Dˆ0; sˆBd, s
?
Ex
)
− kˆ0. Now consider a deviation by the board
whereby it offers package CSI0 (the package that maximizes the board’s payoff in state 0 in
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the symmetric information case). The deviation cannot induce worse beliefs than those in-
duced by Cˆ0, which implies that the board’s payoff from this package can be no worse than
q?1
(
DSI0 ; sˆBd, s
?
Ex
)
. It is then true that:
EuBd−0
(
CSI0 ; sˆBd, s
?
Ex, ρˆ
) ≥ q?1 (DSI0 ; sˆBd, s?Ex) > EuBd−0 (Cˆ0; sˆBd, s?Ex, ρˆ)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that CSI0 is the unique maximizer of the
board’s payoff in the case with symmetric information. Combined, the two inequalities imply
that CSI0 is a profitable deviation from Cˆ0, which contradicts the initial supposition.
Now that we know the package Csep0 offered in the bad state in a separating equilibrium,
consider a strategy sBd = (C
sep
0 , Cθ¯) such that Dθ¯ 6= Dsep0 . Package Cθ¯ is supported in a
separating equilibrium if:
1. when in the good state, the executive can rationally accept it;
2. when in the bad state, the board cannot profitably deviate to it;
3. when in the good state, the board cannot deviate from it.
The first condition implies that package Cθ¯ must satisfy the individually rationality condition
in expression (1.9):
IREx−θ¯ : EuEx−θ¯ (Cθ¯, e
?
θC) = wθ¯ +αkθ¯ + bθ¯
(
θ¯ + bθ¯
µ2
ψ
)
− γ
2
(bθ¯σ)
2− ψ
2
(
bθ¯
µ
ψ
)2
≥ u¯. (1.11)
The second condition imposes incentive compatibility: it asserts that, in equilibrium, the
benefits accruing to the board from offering the deviation package Cθ¯ in the bad state cannot
be larger than the costs. Let the prospective buyers believe that the board is following strategy
sBd as defined above and that the executive is following her optimal strategy s?Ex. The benefit
from a deviation in the bad state is equal to the difference between the buyers’ valuation of the
company after observing Dθ¯ and their valuation after observing D
sep
0 . This benefit is defined
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as:
Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s
?
Ex) ≡ q?1 (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex)− q?1 (Dsep0 ; sBd, s?Ex)
=
[(
θ¯ + bθ¯
µ2
ψ
)
(1− bθ¯)− wθ¯
]
−
[
bsep0
µ2
ψ
− u¯− γ
2
(bsep0 σ)
2 − ψ
2
(
bsep0
µ
ψ
)2]
. (1.12)
In equilibrium, Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex) cannot be negative; otherwise, the board would find it
profitable to deviate to Csep0 in the good state.
The cost of a deviation is equal to the “bribe” that the board must pay the executive to
make her accept the deviation package. The cost is defined as:
F (Dθ¯) ≡ max
{
0,
1
α
[u¯− EuEx−0 (Dθ¯, 0, e?C)]
}
(1.13)
where EuEx−0 (Dθ¯, 0, e?C) represents the executive’s utility from getting a package with observ-
able Dθ¯ and no undisclosed compensation. In equilibrium, the cost must be strictly positive,
as otherwise the board would be able to deviate for free when in the bad state.
The formal expression for the board’s incentive compatibility is then:
ICBd−0 : Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s
?
Ex) ≤ F (Dθ¯) . (1.14)
which, through algebraic manipulation, can be rewritten as
EuEx−0 (Dθ¯, Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s
?
Ex)) ≤ u¯ (1.15)
The rewritten condition illustrates how the board achieves separation if the state is good:
by offering a package including compensation terms Dθ¯ that would not be acceptable to the
executive if the state were bad for any bribe that the board might be rationally willing to pay.
Note that every contract that fulfills IREx−θ¯ and ICBd−0 induces, by the intuitive criterion,
the belief that the firm’s state is good regardless of whether such contract is on or off the
equilibrium path. In effect, this means that the board gets to choose the best package from
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among those that satisfy IREx−θ¯ and ICBd−0. It follows that the third condition for Cθ¯ to be
a part of an equilibrium is that it must maximize the board’s payoff subject to the constraints
given in expressions (1.11) and (1.14):
max
Cθ¯∈ΩC
(
θ¯ + bθ¯
µ2
ψ
)
(1− bθ¯)− wθ¯ − kθ¯
s.t. :
IREx−θ¯ : EuEx−θ¯ (Cθ¯, e?C) ≥ u¯
ICBd−0 : Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex) ≤ F (Dθ¯)
This problem is simplified by lemma 2, which asserts that IREx−θ¯ must bind in equilibrium.
The proof conveys the intuition behind the result.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the executive cannot earn rents above her reservation utility if the
company’s state is good. That is, IREx−θ¯ holds as an equality.
Proof. Suppose instead that a package Cθ¯ is supported in equilibrium such that the executive
earns rents; that is, such that EuEx−θ¯ (Cθ¯, e?C) > u¯. Now consider a deviation whereby the
board offers a smaller wage, equal to wθ¯−, where  is arbitrarily small. The deviation does not
violate either constraint: the executive’s participation is left unaffected as IREx−θ¯ was slack
by assumption under Cθ¯; and the benefit from deviating Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex) increases by  while
the cost F (Dθ¯) increases by
1
α, which, since α ≤ 1, implies that ICBd−0 still holds. Since
incentive compatibility is still respected after the deviation, the intuitive criterion applies and
therefore it must be that the buyers still assess the firm’s state as being good. This implies
that the deviation package credibly signals that the state is good. Because the it reduces
compensation costs while leaving the gross profit and the buyers’ beliefs intact, the proposed
deviation is profitable, which contradicts the initial assertion that the executive can earn rents
in equilibrium.
The lemma makes it possible to re-write constraint IREx−θ¯ as to illustrate how the wage
adjusts to keep the constraint binding:
wθ¯ = u¯− αkθ¯ − bθ¯
(
θ¯ + bθ¯
µ2
ψ
)
+
γ
2
(bθ¯σ)
2 +
ψ
2
(
bθ¯
µ
ψ
)2
. (1.16)
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After substituting wθ¯ in the board’s objective function and in the ICBd−0 constraint, we
get the following simplified maximization problem
max
bθ¯,kθ¯
θ¯ + bθ¯
µ2
ψ − u¯− (1− α) kθ¯ − γ2 (bθ¯σ)2 − ψ2
(
bθ¯
µ
ψ
)2
s.t. : (1.17)
ICBd−0 : Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex) ≤ F (Dθ¯)
where, after some algebra, Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex) is now given by
Q (Dθ¯; sBd, s
?
Ex) = θ¯ +
µ2
ψ
(bθ¯ − bsep0 )−
1
2
(
γσ2 +
µ2
ψ
)[
(bθ¯)
2 − (bsep0 )2
]
+ αkθ¯, (1.18)
and F (Dθ¯) by
F (Dθ¯) =
1
α
[
bθ¯θ¯ + αkθ¯
]
. (1.19)
If constraint ICBd−0 holds for the package that solves the symmetric information problem,
CSI
θ¯
, then the solution to the problem in expression (1.17) is trivial: Csep
θ¯
must be the same
as CSI
θ¯
. When this is the case, we have that the executive’s stake is the same in both states(
bsep
θ¯
= bSI
θ¯
= bSI0 = b
sep
0
)
. The fixed wage, however, is not: because the same stake bSI
θ¯
in
profit gives the executive bSI
θ¯
θ¯ more in expected utility in the good state than it does in the
bad state, in the bad state the board must pay a higher fixed wage to ensure the executive’s
acceptance of the compensation package (that is, wsep0 = w
SI
0 > w
SI
θ¯
= wsep0 ). It follows that,
when ICBd−0 holds when evaluated at CSIθ¯ , signaling is performed through the fixed wage.
Proposition 2 derives the necessary and sufficient condition for Csep
θ¯
to be equal to CSI
θ¯
.
Proposition 2. Compensation package Csep
θ¯
= CSI
θ¯
is supported in a separating equilibrium if
and only if the value of undisclosed compensation to the executive is such that
α ≤ bSIθ¯ =
µ2
µ2 + ψγσ2
.
Proof. CSI
θ¯
solves (1.17) if and only if ICBd−0 holds when evaluated at CSIθ¯ as given in propo-
sition 1. (This is true because CSI
θ¯
maximizes the unconstrained version of problem (1.17).)
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Constraint ICBd−0 evaluated at CSIθ¯ comes down to α ≤ bSIθ¯ .
Proposition 2 thus asserts that the board can offer package CSI
θ¯
in a separating equilibrium
if and only if the executive’s first-best stake in the company’s profit is sufficiently large relative
to the valuation that the executive attaches to undisclosed compensation. This follows from
the fact that the benefit of a bad state deviation to CSI
θ¯
is θ¯
(
1− bSI
θ¯
)
+bSI
θ¯
(
θ¯ − 0) = θ¯ - where
the first term is the signaling gain derived from convincing outsiders that the company’s state
is good and the second term reflects the savings in wages relative to the equilibrium contract
CSI0 - and its cost is
bSI
θ¯
θ¯
α - which reflects the facts that the deviation contract falls short by
bSI
θ¯
θ¯ from achieving the participation of the executive and that it costs the board 1α dollars to
increase the executive’s income by 1 dollar through undisclosed compensation.
In conclusion, signaling does not distort compensation practices if solving the pure moral
hazard problem - that is, if finding the optimal balance between protecting the executive from
risk and incentivizing to exert effort - entails offering the executive a sufficiently large stake
in the company. This large stake is offered if the executive’s effort is valuable (large µ), if
she is not too averse to exerting unobservable effort (small ψ) or not too risk-averse (small γ),
and if the company’s prospects are relatively safe (low σ2). The sufficient size of the stake is
determined by the value that the executive attaches to undisclosed compensation. The larger
α is, the larger the stake must be.
One of the features of the scenario to which proposition 2 applies is that ICBd−0 may not
bind. In other words, it is possible that the costs of a deviation are larger than its benefits.
In the alternative scenario - α > bSI
θ¯
- which will concern us from here on after, ICBd−0 must
bind. Lemma 3 establishes the result formally.
Lemma 3. Let the value that the executive attaches to undisclosed compensation be such that
α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
holds. Then, in any separating equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint
of the board, ICBd−0, must bind.
Proof. After plugging expressions (1.18) and (1.19) in for the benefit and cost of a deviation,
the ICBd−0 constraint is given by:
θ¯ +
µ2
ψ
(bθ¯ − bsep0 )−
1
2
(
γσ2 +
µ2
ψ
)[
(bθ¯)
2 − (bsep0 )2
]
+ αkθ¯ ≤
1
α
[
bθ¯θ¯ + αkθ¯
]
. (1.20)
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Suppose that the inequality holds strictly. Since α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
, proposition 2 implies that
Csep
θ¯
cannot be equal to CSI
θ¯
. Combined with lemma 2, this implies that at last two of the
elements of Csep
θ¯
=
(
wsep
θ¯
, bsep
θ¯
, ksep
θ¯
)
must differ from the corresponding elements in CSI
θ¯
.
First suppose that bsep
θ¯
is one of the elements that differs. That is, let bsep
θ¯
> bSI
θ¯
. (It cannot
be that bsep
θ¯
< bSI
θ¯
; otherwise, since bSI
θ¯
= bsep0 , a deviation in the bad state would be profitable).
Now consider a new package prescribing a stake that is smaller than bsep
θ¯
by an arbitrarily
small amount, and a wage adjusted as to make the participation of the executive rational.
The new package thus satisfies the executive’s individual rationality constraint (because of the
adjustment in the wage) and, because ICBd−0 is slack at b
sep
θ¯
, it also satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraint. With the two constraints still holding, the intuitive criterion applies
and therefore outsiders do not revise their beliefs downwards after observing the new package.
Since the board’s objective function - see expression (1.17) - is concave in bθ¯, and bSIθ¯ (which is
smaller than bsep
θ¯
) is the maximizer of the function, we can conclude that the function takes on
a higher value when evaluated at the new package than when evaluated at bsep
θ¯
, which implies
that the new package configures a profitable deviation.
Now suppose that bsep
θ¯
= bSI
θ¯
. It must then be that wsep
θ¯
6= wSI
θ¯
and ksep
θ¯
6= kSI
θ¯
⇒ ksep
θ¯
> 0.
Consider a new package Cdev
θ¯
that prescribes less undisclosed compensation: kdev
θ¯
= ksep
θ¯
− ,
where  is arbitrarily small. To keep the participation of the executive intact, the wage increases
- see expression (1.16). The net effect is an increase in the board’s payoff - see the objective
function in expression (1.17). The new package decreases the benefits of a bad state deviation
by α and decreases its cost by , making the deviation relatively more attractive. However,
since ICBd−0 is slack for C
sep
θ¯
, if  is sufficiently small the constraint still holds for Cdev
θ¯
, making
it a profitable deviation from Csep
θ¯
.
The analysis of the two possible cases for bsep
θ¯
shows that a profitable deviation must exist
when the ICBd−0 constraint is slack and α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
holds, which is a contradiction of the
initial supposition. Therefore, the constraint most hold as an equality.
The idea behind the proof is simple: if the incentive compatibility constraint does not
bind in equilibrium, then the cost of a deviation must be strictly larger than its benefits.
This means that the board can let the benefits from deviation increase (say, by decreasing
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the executive’s stake or her undisclosed compensation and increasing her wage as to keep her
participation intact) without making the deviation profitable; by doing so, however, it improves
its own payoff, as it substitutes the relatively expensive forms of compensation (variable and
undisclosed) with the relatively cheap one (the wage).
Solving the binding ICBd−0 with respect to kθ¯ then yields:
kθ¯ =
1
1− α
{(
1− bθ¯
α
)
θ¯ +
µ2
ψ
(bθ¯ − bsep0 )−
1
2
(
γσ2 +
µ2
ψ
)[
(bθ¯)
2 − (bsep0 )2
]}
, (1.21)
which simplifies the board’s problem even further to:
max
bθ¯
bθ¯
α θ¯ + b
sep
0
µ2
ψ − u¯− 12
(
γσ2 + µ
2
ψ
)
(bsep0 )
2
st : kθ¯ ≥ 0. (1.22)
where kθ¯ is given by expression (1.21).
The simplified objective function is strictly increasing in bθ¯, thus implying that, among all
the compensation packages that guarantee separation while making ICBd−0 bind, the one that
the board prefers is that which gives the executive the largest feasible stake in the company’s
profit. Feasibility is determined by the constraint of the simplified problem, which states that
undisclosed compensation cannot be negative. Lemma (4) goes one step further: it states that
undisclosed compensation must be equal to zero.
Lemma 4. Let α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Then, in any separating equilibrium, the board offers no undis-
closed compensation to the executive if the company’s state is good. That is, ksep
θ¯
= 0.
Proof. a) For bθ¯ = b
sep
0 , the right hand side of equation (1.21) is strictly positive, which illus-
trates that the constraint in problem (1.22) holds for values in some subset of the domain of
bθ¯
14. b) The right hand side of the equation is a continuous quadratic function of bθ¯ with a
negative quadratic coefficient. Since the board’s objective function in optimization problem
(1.22) is increasing in bθ¯, this implies that the the right hand side of equation (1.21) must be
14Too see why the right hand side of expression (1.21) is positive for bθ¯ = b
sep
0 , first evaluate the expression
at bsep0 and simplify. The assertion then follows from α >
µ2
µ2+ψγσ2
, and bsep0 =
µ2
µ2+ψγσ2
.
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equal to zero, which implies that ksep
θ¯
must be equal to zero.
It follows from the lemma that the executive’s share of the final output in the good state
must solve
1
1− α
{(
1− bθ¯
α
)
θ¯ +
µ2
ψ
(bθ¯ − bsep0 )−
1
2
(
γσ2 +
µ2
ψ
)[
(bθ¯)
2 − (bsep0 )2
]}
= 0 (1.23)
which follows from plugging in kθ¯ = 0 into equation (1.21).
Proposition 3 presents the solution to this equation and summarizes the conclusions about
separating equilibria in this model.
Proposition 3. Let α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Then, one, and only one, separating strategy profile is
supported in equilibrium. In that equilibrium:
1. the board’s separating strategy is ssepBd =
(
Csep0 , C
sep
θ¯
)
such that: Csep0 = C
SI
0 and
Csep
θ¯
=
(
wsep
θ¯
, bsep
θ¯
, ksep
θ¯
)
, where ksep
θ¯
= 0, wsep
θ¯
is given by expression (1.16) and
bsep
θ¯
= bsep0 +
(
ψ
µ2 + ψγσ2
)− θ¯
α
+
√√√√( θ¯
α
)2
+ 2
(
ψγσ2 + µ2
(
1− 1α
)
ψ
)
θ¯
 .
2. the executive follows strategy s?Ex = [δ
?
θC , e
?
C ]θ∈Θ,C∈ΩC .
3. the prospective buyers have beliefs
(a) ρ
(
θ¯|Dθ¯; sBd, s?Ex
)
, ρ
(
θ¯|D0; sBd, s?Ex
)
given by Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path
of any strategy sBd ∈ ΩC × ΩC ;
(b) given by ρ
(
θ¯|D; sBd, s?Ex
)
= 1 if
EuEx−0 (D,Q (D; sBd, s?Ex) , e
?
C) < u¯ ≤ EuEx−θ¯ (D, 0, e?C)
and ρ
(
θ¯|D; sBd, s?Ex
)
= 0 otherwise, off the equilibrium path of any strategy sBd ∈
ΩC × ΩC .
4. the price of the company’s stock is q?1 (D; s) for all D and s.
Proof. The proposition contains two assertions that have not been proved yet. They concern:
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1. The equilibrium expression for bsep
θ¯
.
It is known that bsep
θ¯
must be a solution to equation (1.23), which equates a quadratic
function of bθ¯ to zero. The equation has two solutions but, since the board’s payoff
function is increasing in bθ¯, it must be that b
sep
θ¯
is the largest of the two. The expression
of bsep
θ¯
presented in the proposition is that solution (after algebraic simplification).
2. The description of the outsiders beliefs.
(a) Beliefs on the equilibrium path: on the path induced by any strategy of the board
sBd ∈ ΩC × ΩC , beliefs must be derived through Bayes’ rule.
(b) The belief ρ
(
θ¯|D; sBd, s?Ex
)
= 1 after a package D such that
EuEx−0 (D,Q (D; sBd, s?Ex) , e
?
C) < u¯ ≤ EuEx−θ¯ (D, 0, e?C)
is implied by the application of the intuitive criterion to beliefs off the equilibrium
path. If the buyers observe a package that the executive cannot rationally accept
in the bad state (even when receiving the most undisclosed compensation that the
board can rationally offer), but can accept in the good state, they must believe that
the company is in the good state.
(c) The belief ρ
(
θ¯|D; sBd, s?Ex
)
after other packages: while Bayes’ rule and the intuitive
criterion say nothing about these beliefs, I set them at 0 to ensure that, when the
strategy being played is ssepBd , there are no profitable deviations in either state.
The proposition states that there is a unique separating strategy profile supported in equi-
librium instead of stating that the equilibrium is unique because of the multiplicity of beliefs
that support that equilibrium. While the beliefs on the equilibrium path and those that follow
deviations to which the intuitive criterion applies are determined by the equilibrium concept
presented in definition 1, beliefs after other deviations are unrestricted. The proposition states
that those beliefs are that the state is bad for sure, ensuring that there are no profitable devia-
tions from the proposed strategy profile, but other beliefs - those that assign a sufficiently low
probability to the state being good - also work. For convenience, however, I will often refer to
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the equilibrium derived in the proposition as the unique separating equilibrium.
In sum, the model always has a separating equilibrium. If the value of undisclosed compen-
sation to the executive is low separation is achieved at no cost. Otherwise, it entails distortions
as it forces the board to give sub-optimal incentives to the executive: as asserted in proposition
3, the executive’s stake in this case is given by:
bsep
θ¯
= bsep0 +
(
ψ
µ2 + ψγσ2
)− θ¯
α
+
√√√√( θ¯
α
)2
+ 2
(
ψγσ2 + µ2
(
1− 1α
)
ψ
)
θ¯
 . (1.24)
Since bsep0 is the optimal effort inducing stake, the expression allows us to easily assess the
size of the distortion induced by signaling over the executive’s incentives. The distortion is
bigger the more important the asymmetric information problem is, as measured by θ¯ (this is
illustrated by figure 1.3 in section 1.6, for θ = θ¯).
The characterization of the separating equilibrium is the main result of this paper. It
provides theoretical support to the hypothesis that executive compensation can be used as a
credible signal of inside information. The next sub-subsection confirms that the equilibrium
found in this section is the unique equilibrium of the model by showing that there are no
pooling strategies.
1.4.2.2 Pooling Strategies
The board is said to be playing a pooling strategy if the observable component of the com-
pensation package is the same in both states. That is, a pooling strategy is an object spoolBd =(
Cpool0 , C
pool
θ¯
)
with Cpoolθ =
(
wpool, bpool, kpoolθ
)
for θ
{
0, θ¯
}
and Dpool =
(
wpool, bpool
)
.
Proposition 4 formally states that the model has no pooling equilibria as the board always
has a profitable deviation in the good state from any proposed equilibrium pooling strategy. The
deviation entails offering a package that credibly signals the company’s state at a sufficiently
low cost for the board. By the intuitive criterion, a credible signal gives the buyers the belief
that the firm’s state is good, and hence induces them to make a bid that fully prices in the
value of the state.
Proposition 4. There are no pooling equilibria.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the pooling strategy spoolBd is supported in
equilibrium. Now consider the set:
Λdev
(
Dpool
)
≡
{
Ddev =
(
wdev, bdev
)
∈ ΩD : bdev > bpool andEuEx−θ¯
(
Ddev, 0, e?
)
= u¯
}
which contains the deviations from Dpool that: a) give the executive a larger stake in the firm
than that prescribed by the pooling package; b) if the firm’s state is good, give the executive just
enough expected utility as to make the package acceptable to her without need for undisclosed
compensation.
Suppose that, upon observing a packageDdev ∈ Λdev (Dpool), the prospective buyers become
certain that the firm’s state is good. That is, suppose that ρ
(
θ¯|Ddev; spoolBd , s?Ex
)
= 1. We can
compute the benefits and costs of a deviation to Ddev from Dpool in both states to verify
whether the supposition that ρ
(
θ¯|Ddev; spoolBd , s?Ex
)
= 1 follows from the intuitive criterion for
some Ddev ∈ Λdev (Dpool). If it does, then Ddev is a profitable deviation from Dpool, as the
criterion only applies if the board is better off with the deviation in the good state and strictly
worse off in the bad state. In other words, the criterion applies if the net benefit from deviating
is positive in the good state and strictly negative in the bad state:
[
Qθ¯
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− 0
]
≥ 0 >
[
Q0
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− F0
(
Ddev
)]
(1.25)
Lets start by computing the benefit from a deviation to Ddev. For all θ ∈ {0, θ¯}, the benefit
is given by
Qθ
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
= q1
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
−
[
q1
(
Dpool; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− kpoolθ
]
.
It is useful to compute the difference in the benefits from a deviation to Ddev in state 0
relative to state θ¯:
Q0
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
−Qθ¯
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
= kpool0 − kpoolθ¯ . (1.26)
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Since spoolBd is, according to the initial supposition, supported in equilibrium, the undisclosed
compensation that it prescribes in each state must be exactly what is necessary to induce the
participation of the executive:
kpoolθ = max
{
0,
u¯− EuEx−θ
(
Dpool, 0, e?
)
α
}
.
The difference in the hidden payments awarded in each state is then bounded above:
kpool0 − kpoolθ¯ ≤
bpool
α
θ¯ (1.27)
The combination of (1.26) and (1.27) yields an upper limit to the difference in benefits from
a deviation:
Q0
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
−Qθ¯
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
≤ b
pool
α
θ¯. (1.28)
Lets now turn to the cost of deviating to package Ddev. By definition of the set Λ
(
Dpool
)
to which Ddev belong, in the good state the cost is Fθ¯
(
Ddev
)
= 0. In the bad state, it is
F0
(
Ddev
)
= b
dev
α θ¯ , which means that the difference in costs is given by:
F0
(
Ddev
)
− Fθ¯
(
Ddev
)
=
bdev
α
θ¯. (1.29)
Expressions (1.28) and (1.29), combined with the fact that bdev > bpool, imply that the net
benefit from a deviation in the good state to a package Ddev ∈ Λdev (Dpool) that prompts belief
ρ
(
θ¯|Ddev; spoolBd , s?Ex
)
= 1 is greater than the net benefit from a deviation in the bad state to
that same package:
[
Qθ¯
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− 0
]
−
[
Q0
(
Ddev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− F0
(
Ddev
)]
≥
(
bdev
α
− b
pool
α
)
θ¯ > 0. (1.30)
Now note that the net benefit from a deviation in either state is continuous in bdev and its
graph is a negative parabola truncated to the left at bpool. Because of the change in beliefs that
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Ddev elicits relative to Dpool, this net benefit is also positive for values of bdev sufficiently close
to bpool and negative for larger values. By the intermediate value theorem, it follows that there
is an observable package Dˆdev ∈ Λdev (Dpool) such that Q0 (Dˆdev; spoolBd , s?Ex)− F0 (Dˆdev) = 0
which, by expression (1.30), implies that Qθ¯
(
Dˆdev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
> 0.
The continuity of the net benefit from a deviation in both states and the fact that the net
benefit of a deviation in the bad state is monotonically decreasing in bdev > bˆdev then imply
that for some D˜dev such that b˜dev is in the vicinity of bˆdev, we have
[
Qθ¯
(
D˜dev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− 0
]
≥ 0 >
[
Q0
(
D˜dev; spoolBd , s
?
Ex
)
− F0
(
D˜dev
)]
which implies that the intuitive criterion applies, proving the existence of a profitable deviation
from Dpool.
This proof completes the analysis of the two state model, which has a unique, separating,
equilibrium. This analysis can be extended without too much complication to a case with a
continuum of states.
1.5 Extension: equilibrium with a continuum of states
This section considers a modified model whereby the company’s state is no longer binary but
continuous with bounded support: θ ∈ Θ = [0, θM ].
In the absence of informational asymmetries, the compensation package derived in proposi-
tion 1 would still be offered in every state θ ∈ Θ = [0, θM ]. The rest of this section is dedicated
to the case of asymmetric information.
Board and executive are privately informed about θ ∈ Θ = [0, θM ], while the buyers’ prior
beliefs about the company’s state are represented by the probability density function pθ.
I begin by addressing whether a separating strategy ssepBd =
(
Csepθ
)
θ∈Θ such thatD
sep
θ 6= Dsepθ′
for all θ 6= θ′ can be supported in equilibrium. As before, I start by characterizing some
conditions that a separating strategy must fulfill to be supported in equilibrium, and then
show that a separating equilibrium exists.
The claims in lemmas 1 and 2 still hold in the continuous state model, and their proofs are
32
similar to those presented in the analysis of the two state case, thus not warranting repetition.
As a refresher, lemma 1 established that when the firm is in the lowest state 0, the compensation
package of the executive is that of the symmetric information case: Csep0 = C
SI
0 . Lemma 2
established that the the executive cannot earn rents in any state: EuEx−θ
(
Csepθ , e
?
)
= u¯ (that
is, the lemma states that IREx−θ binds).
The problem that each type θ > 0 must solve is then:
max
Csepθ ∈ΩC
θ + bθ
µ2
ψ − u¯− (1− α) kθ − γ2 (bθσ)2 − ψ2
(
bθ
µ
ψ
)2
st : (1.31)
ICθBd−θ′ : Qθ′
(
Dsepθ ; s
sep
Bd , s
?
Ex
) ≤ Fθ′ (Dsepθ ) ∀θ′ ∈ [0, θ)
In each state θ ∈ Θ, the board now designs the compensation package as to respect a
“family” of incentive compatibility conditions -
{
ICθBd−θ′
}
θ′∈[0,θ) - that ensure that offering
that package is not profitable in any inferior state.
As in the two state case, there are parametrizations of the model for which the first-best
package, offered in the symmetric information case, is a feasible, and thus the optimal, solution
to the problem in every state. Since we must have bSIθ = b
SI
θ′ for all θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ, the channel of
signaling is the wage.
Proposition 5. Offering compensation package Csepθ = C
SI
θ in every state θ ∈ Θ is supported
in a separating equilibrium if and only if the value of undisclosed compensation to the executive
is such that:
α ≤ bSIθ =
µ2
µ2 + ψγσ2
.
Proof. CSIθ solves the problem in expression (1.31) for every state θ if and only if IC
θ
Bd−θ′ holds
when evaluated at CSIθ as given in proposition 1. Suppose then that, in every state θ ∈ Θ, the
board is implementing the first-best package CSIθ . When in an inferior state θ
′ < θ, the board
has no incentive to deviate to CSIθ if Qθ′
(
DSIθ ; s
SI
Bd, s
?
Ex
) ≤ Fθ′ (DSIθ ), which simplifies down
to α ≤ bSIθ .
If α < bSIθ , no incentive compatibility condition binds. If, however, we have that α > b
SI
θ ,
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at least one element of the family of constraints
{
ICθBd−θ′
}
θ′∈[0,θ) must bind for every θ. This
is proved in lemma 5, which is similar in its proof and explanation to lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Let α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Then, in every state θ ∈ Θ \ {0}, the board designs the compen-
sation package so that, for at least one θ˜ (θ) ∈ [0, θ), ICθ
Bd−θ˜ binds.
Proof. Suppose instead that, in a separating equilibrium, there is some state θ ∈ Θ \ {0} such
that ICθBd−θ′ does not bind for any θ
′ ∈ [0, θ). Then, the board can decrease bθ and increase wθ
as to keep IREx−θ binding and still respect all
{
ICθBd−θ′
}
θ′∈[0,θ), thus maintaining separation
(because of the intuitive criterion) and increasing its payoff. (The payoff increases because
bsep0 = b
SI
0 and because of the already asserted fact that the executive’s stake must increase
with the state in any separating equilibrium of the continuous state case.) This constitutes a
contradiction of the assertion that this is an equilibrium, and so it follows that there must be
at least one θ˜ (θ) ∈ [0, θ) such that ICθ
Bd−θ˜(θ) binds.
The lemma simply asserts that there is at least one state in which the board is indifferent
between deviating by offering package Dθ and staying on path. The lemma does not, however,
assert that such state is unique. So let Θ˜ (θ) denote the set of states in which the board is
indifferent between offering the compensation package prescribed in the separating strategy
being played and deviating to Dθ:
Θ˜ (θ) ≡
{
θ˜ ∈ [0, θ) : ICθ
Bd−θ˜ binds
}
.
As in the two state case, it is possible to rewrite, by solving for kθ, any incentive compati-
bility constraint that holds as an equality and use the resulting equation to simplify the board’s
problem in state θ. I do this for state θ˜ (θ) ∈ Θ˜ (θ):
max
bθ
bθ
α θ + bθ˜(θ)
µ2
ψ − u¯− kθ˜(θ) − γ2
(
bθ˜(θ)σ
)2 − ψ2 (bθ˜(θ) µψ)2
st : (1.32)
ICθ
Bd−θ˜(θ) : kθ = kθ˜(θ) +
1
1−αH ≥ 0
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with
H =
(
1− bθ
α
)[
θ − θ˜ (θ)
]
+
(
bθ − bθ˜(θ)
) µ2
ψ
− 1
2
(
γσ2 +
µ2
ψ
)[
(bθ)
2 −
(
bθ˜(θ)
)2]
.
Again as in the two state case, the simplified objective function is strictly increasing in
bθ¯ and subject to the constraint that undisclosed compensation be non-negative. Also as in
the two state case, the constraint binds in any separating equilibrium when α is large enough.
Lemma (6) states this formally.
Lemma 6. Let α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Then, in any separating equilibrium, the board sets undisclosed
compensation at zero in all states: ksepθ = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Same as that of lemma 4.
It follows from lemma (6) that the executive’s share bsepθ of the final output in state θ ∈
Θ solves equation ksep
θ˜(θ)
+ 11−αH = 0 . In the two state case, the lemma asserting that no
undisclosed compensation is paid in equilibrium was the final step before we could find bsepθ as
it was known, by virtue of there being just two states, that θ˜
(
θ¯
)
= 0. In the continuous state
case, it is still necessary to identify at least one state for which incentive compatibility binds
for each θ ∈ Θ.
To that end, lets again consider the benefits and costs of deviating to a package offered in
equilibrium in a superior state. The purpose is now to write benefits and costs in a way that
helps shed light over each θ˜ (θ) ∈ Θ˜ (θ).
The benefit from a deviation in state θ′ to a package Dθ offered on the equilibrium path in
state θ is given by
Qθ′ (Dθ; sBd, s
?
Ex) = q
?
1 (Dθ; sBd, s
?
Ex)− q?1 (Dθ′ ; sBd, s?Ex) . (1.33)
By adding and subtracting q?1 (Dθ′′ ; sBd, s?Ex) to this expression for any θ
′′ such that θ′′ <
θ′ < θ, we can re-write Qθ′ (Dθ; sBd, s?Ex) as the difference between the benefits from a deviation
in state θ′′ to the package offered in state θ and the benefits from a deviation in that same
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state θ′′ to the package offered in state θ′:
Qθ′ (Dθ; sBd, s
?
Ex) = Qθ′′ (Dθ; sBd, s
?
Ex)−Qθ′′ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s?Ex) . (1.34)
The cost from a deviation in state θ′ to package Dθ is, as in the two state case,
Fθ′ (Dθ) ≡ max
{
0,
1
α
[u¯− EuEx−θ′ (Dθ, 0, e?C)]
}
which, using the facts that θ′ is smaller than θ and that, in equilibrium, IREx−θ binds - and
so, EuEx−θ (Cθ, e?C) = u¯ - and kθ = 0, boils down to
Fθ′ (Dθ) =
bθ
α
(
θ − θ′) . (1.35)
Armed with expressions (1.34) and (1.35), we are in a better position to find θ˜ (θ). In fact,
lemma 7 asserts that 0 ∈ Θ˜ (θ) for all θ > 0.
Lemma 7. Let α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Then, for all θ ∈ Θ \ {0}, ICθBd−0 binds.
Proof. Suppose instead that there is at least one state θ′ such that ICθBd−0 does not bind. That
is, the benefits from a deviation in state 0 to the package offered in state θ′ are strictly lower
than the costs:
ICθ
′
Bd−0 : Q0 (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex) <
bθ′
α
θ′ (1.36)
while for every θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ (θ′) (which is non-empty by lemma 7) the following is true:
ICθ
′
Bd−θ˜ : Qθ˜ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex) =
bθ′
α
(
θ′ − θ˜
)
. (1.37)
Using expression (1.34) I re-write Qθ˜ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex) in terms of the benefits from deviation in
some θˆ < θ˜ ≡ inf Θ˜ (θ′) to θ′ and any θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ (θ′):
Qθ˜ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex) = Qθˆ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex)−Qθˆ
(
Dθ˜; sBd, s
?
Ex
)
(1.38)
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Note that θˆ is well defined because 0 /∈ Θ˜ (θ′). Combining expressions (1.37), and (1.38), it
follows that:
Qθˆ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex)−Qθˆ
(
Dθ˜; sBd, s
?
Ex
)
=
bθ′
α
(
θ′ − θ˜
)
(1.39)
By definition of θˆ, it must also be true that:
Qθˆ (Dθ′ ; sBd, s
?
Ex) <
bθ′
α
(
θ′ − θˆ
)
(1.40)
Combining (1.39) and (1.40), it follows that:
Qθˆ
(
Dθ˜; sBd, s
?
Ex
)
<
bθ′
α
(
θ˜ − θˆ
)
for all θˆ < θ˜. This implies that there is no state for which IC θ˜θ binds, a contradiction to lemma
5.
It follows from the lemma that, in every state θ ∈ (0, θM ], the package offered in each state
θ in a separating equilibrium of the continuous state case is exactly the package that would be
offered in state θ¯ in the two state case if θ¯ were equal to θ.
Proposition 6 summarizes the conclusions regarding the continuous state model.
Proposition 6. If α > µ
2
µ2+ψγσ2
, one, and only one, separating strategy profile is supported in
equilibrium. In such equilibrium:
1. the board’s separating strategy is ssepBd =
(
Csepθ
)
θ∈Θ such that C
sep
0 = C
SI
0 and C
sep
θ = C
sep
θ¯
,
where Csep
θ¯
is the package offered to the executive in the good state in the two state model
if that good state is equal to θ.
2. the executive follows strategy s?Ex = [δ
?
θC , e
?
C ]θ∈Θ,C∈ΩC .
3. the prospective buyers have beliefs
(a) ρ (θ|D; sBd, s?Ex) given by Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path of strategy sBd ∈ Ω#ΘC ;
(b)
´ θM
θ′ ρ (θ|D; sBd, s?Ex) dθ = 1 if
EuEx−θ′′ (D,Q (D; sBd, s?Ex) , e
?
C) < u¯ ≤ EuEx−θ′ (D, 0, e?C)
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for all θ′′ < θ′ off the equilibrium path of strategy sBd ∈ Ω#ΘC ;
4. the price of the company’s stock is q?1 (D; s) for all D and s.
Proof. The only assertion that has not been proved is that contained in clause (b) of the
statement on beliefs. The clause follows directly from the application of the intuitive cri-
terion. If, when the buyers believe that board is following strategy sBd, the board can
profitably induce the executive into accepting an observable deviation package D (such that
´ θ¯
θ′ ρ (θ|D; sBd, s?Ex) dθ = 1) when in state θ′ or better but not when in any inferior state, then
the intuitive criterion implies that the buyers cannot believe that there is any probability that
the state of the company is worse than θ′.
The model has no equilibria that include pooling by the board in some states by the same
reason employed in the proof of proposition 4: because beliefs are assumed to satisfy the
intuitive criterion, when in one of the highest states in which it is supposed to offer a pooling
package, the board can always find a profitable deviation.
As was true about the analysis of the two state model, the analysis of the continuous state
model establishes that only one strategy by the board is supported in equilibrium, and that is
a separating strategy. The next section computes and discusses the comparative statics of this
equilibrium.
1.6 Discussion and comparative statics
The continuous state space model underpins this section, which discusses how the parameters
of the model - measuring risk, the executive’s attitudes towards risk and effort, the value of
her effort to the company, and the value of undisclosed compensation - affect the size of the
distortion to compensations packages created by signaling, and affect economic efficiency.
To start the analysis, it is convenient to recall the executive’s stake in the company. By
proposition 6, in state θ ∈ Θ, that stake is given by the expression
bsepθ =

bsep0 +
(
ψ
ψγσ2+µ2
)[
− θα +
√(
θ
α
)2
+ 2
(
ψγσ2+µ2(1− 1α)
ψ
)
θ
]
if α > bsep0
bsep0 if α ≤ bsep0
(1.41)
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Figure 1.2: Graphical determination of the executive’s equilibrium stake in the company.
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Figure 1.3: Relation between θ and the distortion to the executive’s stake bsepθ − bsep0
where bsep0 =
µ2
µ2+ψγσ2
. Recall that the equilibrium stake bsepθ was found by equating the
benefits of a deviation to its costs. (Figure illustrates this equilibrium determination for a
baseline parametrization of θ = 2, µ = 3, ψ = 1, γ = 1, σ2 = 4, α = 0.8, which also underlies
the other figures in this section. Note that the origin for the x-coordinate is bsep0 .)
Since stake bsep0 optimally balances the executive’s exposure to risk with incentive provi-
sion, the more bsepθ deviates from it, the larger the distortion introduced by signaling will be.
This distortion to performance-based pay, given by bsepθ − bsep0 , can be easily computed from
expression (1.41). For large α (α > bsep0 ), the executive’s stake b
sep
θ increases with θ and so
does the distortion created by signaling. This is illustrated in figure 1.3.
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Since the executive never earns rents above u¯ and competition in the stock market prevents
the buyers from keeping any surplus, changes in the parameters affect welfare only through
their impact upon the utility of the board. In state θ, social welfare is given by
WFθ = q
?
1
(
Dsepθ ; s
sep
)
+ u¯ =
bsepθ
α
θ + bsep0
µ2
ψ
− γ
2
(bsep0 σ)
2 − ψ
2
(
bsep0
µ
ψ
)2
. (1.42)
The welfare loss relative to the case with symmetric information is then a function of the
distortion to the executive’s stake in the company:
Lθ ≡WFθ −WFSIθ =
θ
α
(
bsepθ − bsep0
)
. (1.43)
The following subsections contain the analysis of the comparative statics induced by each
parameter. This analysis is underpinned by the derivatives of the distortion to compensation
with respect to the parameters. Given their size, the derivatives are omitted. Since some
parameters measure related characteristics, some sections contain more than one parameter.
Informational Asymmetries - The Probability Density pθ
The density function pθ has a natural interpretation as a measure of the importance of in-
formational asymmetries between the insiders and outsiders of the company. The larger the
cumulative probability is when assessed at a state close to zero, the less important the infor-
mational asymmetries are.
The executive’s stake in the company is not affected by pθ in any state. What pθ does
affect, if α > bsep0 , is the average stake in the company’s profit handed out to the executive
and, consequently, her average total income, both of which are larger when large states are
likelier15. The model thus predicts that, among companies that use executive compensation as
a signaling device, those in which asymmetries are unimportant should give out smaller stakes
to their executives and less total pay.
There is some empirical support for the prediction that performance-based pay is more
15Because the executive is risk averse, her expected income must increase when her stake in the company
increases to ensure that her expected utility remains the same (at u¯).
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important when asymmetric information is likely to be present. This support is found when
two different proxies for asymmetric information are used. First, Bizjak et al. (1993) find that
the ratio of salary plus end-of-year bonus - which, in the context of this paper’s model, might be
seen as a proxy for the wage - to total incentives is decreasing in the the growth opportunities
of a company, while Smith and Watts (1992) show that growth firms are likelier to implement
equity based plans16.
Second, Smith and Watts (1992) and Bizjak et al. (1993) also find that regulated firms
are less likely to implement equity based plans. Using two deregulation events as the basis
for their work, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) find that “deregulations substantially changed
the level and structure of compensation: the variable components of pay increased along with
performance-pay sensitivities and, at the same time, the fixed component of pay fell.”
The Value of Undisclosed Compensation α
As previously discussed, when α is small the board is able to signal the state of the company
without inducing any distortions. When α crosses the threshold bSIθ = b
sep
0 =
µ2
µ2+ψγσ2
, however,
the executive’s stake becomes distorted. This distortion, as well as the welfare loss caused by it,
increase with the size of α, a phenomenon illustrated in figure 1.4a. The intuition behind this
dynamic is the following: an increase in α makes undisclosed compensation more valuable to
the executive, which reduces the cost that the board must support, in every state but the best,
to induce the executive into accepting a contract offered in better states. Then, separation can
only be maintained if, in every state but the worst, the executive receives a sufficiently larger
stake in the company that again raises the cost of a deviation in any of the states beneath
it unaffordable. Graphically, the change in α amounts to a shift to the right of the cost of
deviation function F0 (Dθ) represented in figure 1.2.
As the monetary value attached by the executive to a dollar in undisclosed compensation,
α is affected by the opportunities available to the board to offer undisclosed compensation.
16Bizjak et al. (1993) base the hypothesis that growth opportunities measure informational asymmetries on
two observations: first, growth is usually derived from new products, about which the information gap between
insiders and outsiders is likely to be at its largest; second, growth opportunities can take many years to develop
which implies that the information gap takes a long time to be resolved.
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Figure 1.4: Comparative statics of the size of the distortion to the executive’s stake.
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These opportunities are likely to be determined by the securities exchange regulations that the
company is subject to - in particular, by the scope of inside trading and compensation disclosure
rules that apply to the company and by the resources available to the regulator that enforces
those rules - as well as by idiosyncratic features of the company and of its large investors and
board members. For example, the pool of pet projects that an executive can adopt is likely
to be larger, and hence more valuable, when the company has its headquarters in a large city
and operates in large markets; and better connected and more powerful investors and board
members can exert more influence to favor the executive’s friends and family members in their
professional endeavors.
Risk σ2 and risk aversion γ
As figure 1.4b illustrates, the executive’s stake in the company in the lowest state (bsep0 ) and
in any state θ (bsepθ ) decreases monotonically with risk σ
2 and with her aversion to risk γ, as is
standard in the executive compensation literature. For low values of either parameter, the stake
is the same in all states and therefore decreases at the same rate in all states; eventually, as risk
or risk-aversion keep increasing, the first-best stake can no longer be part of a compensation
package that credibly signals the company’s state, and the executive’s stake in the company’s
profits is distorted. The distortion, measured by bsepθ − bsep0 , then increases with γ and σ2, as
does the welfare loss that the distortion causes. Two effects account for this result. The first
degree effect is that an increase in risk or risk aversion prompts the company to reduce the
executive’s stake across states to protect her from risk. The second degree effect is that this
lower stake reduces the costs of deviating in lower states, which in turn forces the board to
increase the distortion in its provision of incentives to the executive.
The marginal value of effort µ and the degree of effort aversion ψ
An increase in the marginal value of the executive’s effort decreases, and eventually eliminates,
the distortions caused by signaling (see figure 1.4d). Two effects account for this result. The
first degree effect is that when the executive’s effort is more valuable, the company finds it
optimal to induce more of it in all states by giving the executive a higher stake in the company.
The second degree effect is that these higher stakes across states raise the costs of deviating
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in lower states, which in turn allows the board to reduce the distortion in its provision of
incentives to the executive.
As a measure of the executive’s marginal value, µ is likely to be larger in companies in
which executives have a more entrepreneurial and less managerial role.
The executive’s stake in the company in the lowest state (bsep0 ) and in any state θ (b
sep
θ )
decreases monotonically with her aversion to effort ψ; as for the distortion in the executive’s
stake, after it appears it increases with ψ (see figure 1.4c). The mechanics are similar to those
of the risk parameters, so I will not repeat them.
Parameter ψ might be interpreted as a measure of the agency problem faced by the company.
In light of this interpretation, the comparative statics of ψ predict that companies where the
board is better able to monitor their executives endure fewer distortions in the setting of
executive compensation.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows how, under some conditions, boards can use disclosed executive compensation
to credibly convey information to outsiders, and then characterizes the distortions that this use
introduces in compensation practices. This conclusion outlines the empirical and theoretical
projects that I intend to pursue as a continuation to the research agenda here initiated.
The theory outlined in this paper would benefit from an empirical study that directly
addressed its prediction that when boards have a short-term bias, executive compensation
practices may be distorted by signaling. To this end, I plan to use stockholder turnover in
public companies as a proxy for the temporal orientation of the board and then observe how
stock prices react to the disclosure of new compensation packages. Since companies without
a short-term bias do not have a motive to use compensation as a signal and therefore are not
(intentionally) attempting to transmit information, their stock prices should exhibit a smaller
variance after disclosure than those of companies with a short-term bias. The decision to
observe the variance of stock prices after disclosure instead of average power of incentives is
due to the fact that companies showing less stockholder turnover may also suffer from fewer
agency problems, and therefore might not need as much performance-based pay to induce effort
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provision.
I also intend to apply and extend the signaling approach to executive compensation pro-
posed in this paper to address equity grants to non-executive workers who cannot affect their
company’s stock price. The underlying idea is that, if insiders have imperfect signals about
future performance, and those signals are not perfectly correlated, offering variable pay to sev-
eral agents may increase the amount of information available for the statistical inference of a
company’s state.
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CHAPTER 2: A NETWORK EFFECTS THEORY OF THE FINANCIAL AUDITS MARKET
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies indicate that concentration in national markets for financial audits varies sig-
nificantly across market segments. When segmentation is performed according to company
revenue, the data indicate that concentration is higher in segments containing companies with
high revenue: figure 2.1 illustrates how the “Big 4” audit firms audited 98% of the companies
listed in the U.S. with more than $1 billion dollars in revenue in 2006 but only 22% of those
with less than $100 million. When segmentation is performed according to the type of owner-
ship, concentration is higher in the public company segment (Langli and Svanström, 2013 and
Velte and Stiglbauer, 2012). The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation
for these market outcomes.
Existing theories explain audit market outcomes as the result of heterogeneity of audit firms
in terms of quality. They argue that the Big 4 auditors perform better, but costlier, audits
and thus audit only the clients that value high quality auditing enough. This paper proposes
a new economic theory of the organization of financial audit markets whereby the correlation
between the size or ownership type of a company and the likelihood that it is audited by a large
audit firm can arise even though the expected - or perceived - quality of every audit firm is
the same. First, the paper provides a micro-founded model of the demand for financial audits
that explains concentration in audit markets. Then, it provides a simple model of the supply
of financial audits based on diseconomies of scale. Finally, the two models are brought together
to explain the variability of concentration across segments.
The model of audit demand provides the underlying force behind concentration. It pro-
poses that concentration appears in audit markets because it generates a network externality.
Investors - whose preferences drive their companies’ procurement of an auditor - care about the
quality of the audit firms that audit their companies, as this quality determines the accuracy
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Figure 2.1: "Big 4" market share among public companies by 2006 revenue (revenue in millions
of USD). Source: (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008)
of the financial statements of those companies. Quality is random and unobservable but, with
time, information about it appears in the form of publicly observable audit errors, thus allowing
investors to update their beliefs about their audit firm’s quality. Audit firms with large client
portfolios allow for more observations and, therefore, for more precise beliefs, which improves
the decision making of investors.
The model of audit supply creates a limit to concentration and, therefore, helps answer the
question of why a financial audit market contains more than one audit firm. The main tenet
of the model is that audit firms face diseconomies of scale, caused by rising managerial and
bureaucratic costs in the spirit of Coase (1937). The underlying idea is that audit firms see
important agency conflicts between the teams conducting field work and the managerial ranks
that increase in importance as the firms expand.
The paper builds on the idea of diseconomies of scale and on the micro-founded portrayal
of audit firms as economic networks that give their clients positive network effects, to develop
two alternative explanations for the variability of market concentration across segments. The
two explanations rely on two different parametrizations of the paper’s baseline model. The first
explanation is driven by heterogeneity in the informational asymmetries within each company.
It proposes that when companies differ in terms of how much their investors value auditing,
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those where investors value auditing the most - that is, those in which the informational
asymmetries between management and investors are more severe - gain more from being audited
by big audit firms. I show that, in any efficient equilibrium of the heterogeneous informational
asymmetries case, companies suffering from more severe informational asymmetries “cluster”
around big auditors, while companies with milder asymmetries do the same, but to a less
significant extent, around small auditors.
The second explanation is driven by heterogeneity in the “public visibility” of each com-
pany, with visibility defined as the probability that a company’s audit errors become public.
The hypothesis behind the public visibility explanation is that companies have idiosyncratic
properties - like the industry they operate in, the brands they own, their corporate culture,
or their aforementioned size and legal status - that affect the probability that accounting mis-
statements, and hence, audit mistakes, will be publicly observed. When companies differ in
terms of the likelihood that errors in their audits become public, those that are more visible
are more valuable network users from the perspective of the other users than those that are less
visible, as their audit outcomes provide more informative observations of their auditors’ qual-
ity. I show that, in any efficient equilibrium of the heterogeneous visibility case, high visibility
clients appoint big auditors.
In both parametrizations of the model, large auditors are able to charge higher audit fees.
Also in both parametrizations, auditors are able to earn positive economic profits without
creating an incentive for entry in the market.
Both the public visibility and informational asymmetries explanations fit the stylized facts
about market concentration in different market segments: informational asymmetries are, on
average, more significant in public or large companies than in private or small companies;
and big and/or public companies are typically more visible than their small and/or private
counterparts.
The network effects theory of audit markets developed here thus seems capable to account
for market concentration patterns. But at what level (global, continental, national, regional)
of the audit market does the theory work? The paper’s explanation for concentration is that
clients prefer audit firms with large client portfolios. This preference is due to the fact that
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an audit firm’s audits are uniform in terms of quality, and therefore observing how the audit
firm performs in its other audits allows the client to learn about its quality. Depending upon
the purpose of the analysis, an audit firm can be the set of legal entities operating under a
global “brand” name, a national legal entity, or a local office with regional scope. Local offices
are almost fully autonomous entities led by partners who monitor the staff conducting the field
work and make all the decisions with material impact in audit reports. While a complete audit
may draw upon work from several offices in different geographic locations, one single office
typically coordinates this work and makes most of the material contributions, and therefore
has a dominant influence over the quality of the audit. At the same time, local offices abide
by nation-wide company standards. So, at which level can significant quality uniformity be
guaranteed: the national level or the office level?
If company wide standards - and the extent to which they are enforced - play a significant
role in audit quality, uniformity might be guaranteed at the national level. If the standards
are relatively unimportant, the paper’s theory applies to the organization of local geographic
markets for financial audits. Either way, while the theory explains the number of audit firms
that dominate a local or national market and how such market is segmented, it does not account
for the stylized fact that it is the local offices of a few global audit brands that dominate most
markets. A possible explanation for this fact is that audit brands serve as a coordination device
for clients pursuing network effects.
In summary, this paper’s theory of the audit market is as follows. Auditors work as networks
that bestow on each client a positive benefit that increases with the number of its other clients.
In one version, this benefit varies according to the visibility of those clients. In another version,
clients are homogenous in terms of visibility, but heterogeneous in terms of their taste for
network effects. Outcomes in local or national markets are determined competitively in light
of these network effects and of diseconomies of scale. Global aggregates reflect these outcomes
and the fact that brands act as a coordination device.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section addresses the related literature.
Section 2.3 develops a model of audit demand, while section 2.4 presents a simple model of
audit supply, a model of audit market interaction, and the equilibrium analysis of that market.
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The conclusion proposes paths for future research. 
2.2 Discussion of the literature
Existing literature argues that big auditors owe their size to the superior quality of their audits
- see, for example, Lennox (1999) or Khurana and Raman (2004). This consensus around
the cause of size breaks down when the subject of study is the motive for the large auditors’
higher quality. There are two popular explanations: reputation concerns (DeAngelo, 1981) and
deep pockets (Dye, 1993). These two theories of quality differentiation assert that the alleged
superior quality of large audit firms is in fact a by-product of their size, in the sense that size
creates stronger incentives to the provision of quality. This superior quality then reinforces the
size of the large audit firms by making their retention even more beneficial to clients. These
accounts, however, treat auditor size differences as exogenously given and do not address the
motives that made big auditors big in the first place, something that this paper attempts to
address.
Perceived auditor quality is likely to be a relevant parameter when a company searches for
an auditor. Because of that, audit firms competing for the same client have an incentive to
provide the quality that gives that client the most value. In reality, the quality of a financial
auditor depends upon two factors: the quality of the field work of collecting and analyzing data;
and the quality of the auditing firm’s internal monitoring. Both factors are at least partially
explained by the features and decisions of the people that carry them out: honesty, technical
skill, and effort. An auditing firm’s staff, from field work operative to partners, is not a firm
specific asset and can be hired in an open labor market in which good talent, while scarce, is
not rarefied. It follows that ex-ante quality differences alone should not explain why visible
clients tend to choose one of the Big 4 auditors. Otherwise, smaller auditors could replicate
that quality and capture a larger share of those clients.
This is not, of course, to say that audit firms have the same realized quality. A talented,
apparently honest partner may turn out to be corrupt; an apparently competent one may turn
out to be incompetent; and internal controls may be designed with the best intentions but
contain flaws. Hiring a large auditor gives that client the knowledge that, in the future, she
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will have a more accurate perspective of that auditor’s true quality and a better idea of how
much weight to put on its reports. This gives clients an incentive to select auditors with more,
and more visible, clients.
Having completed the discussion of the determinants of auditor size, I now turn to research
containing evidence related to this paper’s claims. Chaney and Philipich (2002) and Weber
et al. (2008) detail how the stock prices of companies audited by audit firms involved in two
different accounting scandals suffer abnormal decreases. Their findings provide support to the
hypothesis that the outcomes of other companies’ audits contain information about the quality
of the audits of companies using the same auditor and inform stockholders in their decision
making1.
The literature also presents corroboration for the ideas that companies with higher agency
costs tend to hire larger auditors (Johnson and Lys, 1990) - which is compatible with this
paper’s informational asymmetries explanation - and that large auditors charge higher audit
fees (Chan et al., 1993) - something that the paper also predicts.
2.3  A model of audit demand with network effects
This section provides a micro-founded model of audit demand whereby the benefit that an
audit client derives from the appointment of a particular auditor depends upon the number of
clients in that auditor’s portfolio and upon idiosyncratic characteristics of those clients. This
model will be used in section 2.4 in conjunction with a model of audit supply to characterize
equilibria in the financial audit market.
2.3.1 Model description
The fundamental premise of the model of audit demand is that companies harbor a conflict of
interests between managers and investors regarding the communication of financial information:
investors want to base their investment decisions on correct information, while managers have
1Chaney and Philipich (2002) for example, look at the Enron scandal and report that “(o)n the three days
following Andersen’s admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded, we find that Ander-
sen’s other clients experienced a statistically negative market reaction, suggesting that investors downgraded
the quality of the audits performed by Andersen. We also find that audits performed by Andersen’s Houston
office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date.”
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a vested interest in reporting positive information. Auditing is valuable to investors because it
serves as a verification mechanism of the financial reports produced by managers.
The model addresses a market for financial audits in which there are I potential client
companies, indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., I}, each with one manager and one investor. Each company
has one asset in place that needs financing from the investor to reach maturity and yield a
return.
If financed, company i’s asset yields a return:
pii = vi + Li
where Li is the certain component of the return and vi is the uncertain component which may
take two values: vi ∈ {0, θi}, with θi > 0. Manager and investor both know the value of Li;
however, they are asymmetrically informed about vi: the manager knows its value, the investor
does not. The investor is the claimant of the return if she does indeed finance the company, and
she has an alternative investment opportunity that yields a net return of p¯i. I assume that this
alternative opportunity is such that it can only be profitable to finance company i if vi = θi.
This is codified in assumption A1:
A1:Li < p¯i < θi + Li.
It follows that for the investor to decide to finance the company, she must attach a suf-
ficiently high probability to the value of vi being θi. What follows is the description of how
this paper models the initial situation of asymmetric information and of the channels through
which auditing helps the investor acquire information with which to decide whether to finance
the company. Events unfold over four stages, numbered 1 through 4. In the first two, the
investor acquires information; in the third, she makes a decision; and in the fourth, she claims
her returns.
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Stage 1 - asymmetric information and information acquisition by the investor:
financial reporting and auditing
The value of the uncertain return is randomly determined in the beginning of stage 1. With
probability q, vi is equal to 0, and with probability 1−q it is equal to θi. The manager observes
vi, while the investor has beliefs given by 1− q and q.
After learning vi, the manager must prepare a financial statement about the value of asset;
this statement can be interpreted as a balance sheet. For simplicity of notation, and since
the only component of the asset’s return over which there is asymmetric information is the
uncertain one, the financial statement concerns only vi and is denoted as Vi. I assume that
the manager has a vested interest in obtaining financing and therefore always reports Vi = θi2.
The manager is therefore not a strategic agent in this model, and his introduction here merely
serves a narrative purpose.
On its own, the financial statement prepared by the manager is uninformative. Now,
suppose that company i previously retained an auditor a (i). This auditor examines the financial
statement of the company and issues an audit report to the investor expressing its truthful
opinion about whether Vi is correct or not. In effect, then, the audit report is the auditor’s
opinion about the value of the uncertain component of the company’s asset. I denote the
audit report as vˆi and let it take a value in the set {0, θi}. The following matrix describes
the probability Pr [vˆi|vi] of the auditor’s report being vˆi conditional on the true value of the
uncertain component of the return, vi, under the assumption that the auditor always reports
its true opinion:
2The manager’s motivations are unmodeled here but may be seen as being due to be career concerns (admit-
ting that the asset has a low return may reflect poorly on his managerial ability), job security considerations
(he needs the company’s asset to be funded to keep his job), or empire building ambitions. There is an implicit
assumption that if it is later on determined that the manager’s financial reporting was incorrect, he is either
shielded from negative consequences (say, because it cannot be proved that the manager purposely “cooked” the
books), or those consequences are small enough. In reality, accounting decisions often involve making judgment
calls about how to recognize assets or revenue with uncertain value; when this uncertainty is present, there is
an interval of valuations that might be plausible to outsiders, giving management the opportunity to report a
value in the frontier of that interval. This kind of leway is precisely the reason why auditors play an important
role.
We can interpret the manager’s report of Vi = θi as standing at the frontier of plausibility (before audit).
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vi
θi 0
vˆi
θi 1 1− da(i)
0 0 da(i)
These probabilities reflect the auditor’s technical ability to find an accounting misstatement
(which is defined as occurring when vi 6= Vi, and that, given my assumption that Vi = θi for
all vi ∈ {0, θi}, occurs whenever vi = 0). While the auditor never forms an incorrect opinion
about vi when vi = θi, it only detects misstatements with probability da(i).
Stage 2 - additional information acquisition: private observation of audit errors
and public observation of audit errors
When da(i) is smaller than 1, the auditor is susceptible to committing an error. When the
auditor does commit an error in stage 1, the investor detects it with probability d in stage
23. Notationally, error observation is represented by the variable ei, which takes value e (error
is observed) or value ∅ (no error is observed) and we have that d ≡ Pr [ei = ε|vˆi = θi, vi = 0].
Error detection leads the investor to the conclusion that the uncertain return is equal to 0.
Audit errors are initially private. With probability σi, however, an audit error becomes
public information visible by all companies in the market. Notationally, public error observation
is represented by the variable epi , which may either take value ε
p (error is observed by the public)
or value ∅ (no error is observed). The probability σi is a measure of company i’s public visibility.
The I companies in the model differ across this measure: a number I¯ ≤ I of them have “high
visibility” σ¯ > 0, while the remaining I − I¯ have “low visibility” 04.
It follows from the description above that the public revelation of an error in company
i’s audit report does not improve the information available to that company’s investor. Why,
then, does the public disclosure of errors matter? The answer lays in the fact that the investor
i does not know her auditor’s ability to detect misstatements. Instead, each investor enter the
3Investors may detect an error through their own research efforts or through the work of financial analysts,
consultants, or additional auditors.
4The extreme assumption that a low visibility company’s parameter σi is equal to zero instead of a positive
number smaller than σ¯ makes the analysis simpler without impacting the conclusions of the analysis.
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game with the belief that da(i) is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]:
da(i) ∼ U [0, 1] .
It follows that, from the investor’s stage 1 perspective, the expected quality of each auditor is
E1
(
da(i)
)
= 12 and the variance of that quality is var1
(
da(i)
)
= 112 . More importantly, it also
follows that, from this ex-ante perspective, auditors are similar5.
We thus have that, because the investor does not know her auditor’s quality, the observation
of the auditor’s errors (or lack thereof) in other companies - if the auditor does indeed have
more clients - gives her more information with which update her beliefs about that quality. We
will see that, under some conditions, these beliefs affect the investor’s decision making.
Stages 3 and 4 - the investor’s decision and return realization
In stage 3 each investor must decide whether to finance her company or to pursue the alternative
investment opportunity that yields an expected return of p¯i. The decision of company i’s
investor is denoted by yi, which is equal to i if the investor decides to finance company i, and
to y¯ if she selects the alternative opportunity.
The investor selects yi after observing the financial report Vi (which is completely unin-
formative, as it is always equal to θi), the audit report vˆi, the realization of the private audit
error (or lack thereof) ei ∈ {∅, ε}, and the realization of public errors (or lack thereof) for each
company in the market,
{
epj
}
j=1,...,I
∈ {∅, εp}I . The only information that matters to her,
however, is the audit report, the realization of the private audit error, and the realization of
public errors committed by her auditor, which I denote as Pa(i) ≡
{
epj
}
j∈Υa(i)
∈ {∅, εp}Ia(i) ,
where the set Υa(i) is the client portfolio of company i’s auditor:
Υa(i) = {j ∈ {1, ...I} : a (j) = a (i)}
and Ia(i) = #Υa(i) is the number of companies in that set.
5Under this premise, the phenomenon that this paper sets out to explain - the structure of the financial
audits market observed in reality - cannot be explained with the argument that different companies have
different preferences regarding the auditor’s quality.
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Stage Relevant information obtained by i
Common θj , d, σj for all j ∈ {1, ..., I}
Pr [vj = θj ] = (1− q) for all j ∈ {1, ..., I}
knowledge Υa = {j ∈ {1, ..., I} : a (j) = a} for all a
da ∼ U [0, 1] for all a
1 Audit report vˆi from auditor a (i)
2
Private error observation ei ∈ {∅, ε} :
Pr [ei = ε|vi = 0, vˆi = θi] = d
Public error observation Pa(i) ≡
{
epj
}
j∈Υa(i)
∈ {∅, εp}Ia(i) :
Pr
[
epj = ε
p|ej = ε
]
= σj
Table 2.1: Stockholder i′s acquisition of information by stage
An investment selection strategy yˆi therefore specifies the investor’s course of action for any
realization of
(
vˆi, ei,Pa(i)
) ∈ {0, θi}×{∅, ε}×{∅, εp}Ia(i) . Table 2.1 summarizes the information
acquired by stockholder i in each stage and serves as a reference for the rest of the paper.
In stage 4 the investor claims the return from the opportunity that she decided to finance.
She is risk-neutral, and therefore her realized utility is given by:
ui (yi, a (i)) =

pii − Fi,a if yi = i; a (i) = a
p¯i − Fi,a if yi = y¯; a (i) = a
pii if yi = i; a (i) = ∅
p¯i if yi = y¯; a (i) = ∅
(2.1)
where Fi,a is the audit fee due to the auditor a when a is selected to audit company i. Two
assumptions are implicit in this utility function. First, the amount of cash initially available
to the investor is normalized to zero. Second, the investor bears the cost of paying for the
financial audit.
2.3.2 The economic value of audits
The model described in subsection 2.3.1 provides a framework with which to study the economic
value of auditing and, in particular, to study how an auditor may be the source of network
effects. The current subsection begins this study by computing the benefit that the investor
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derives from auditing.
Let E0 (pii|yˆi, a (i)) denote investor i’s expectation regarding the return to the company’s
asset as assessed before the beginning of stage 1, given the identity of company i’s auditor
a(i), and an investment selection strategy yˆi. I then define the expected benefit that investor
i derives when some auditor a is in place to be:
αi,a ≡ E0 (pii|yˆi, a (i))− E0 (pii|yˆi, ∅) (2.2)
This expression is at the center of this paper. Its analysis will make apparent how, under
some assumptions, the expected benefit αi,a from appointing an auditor a has a fixed component
that does not vary across auditors and a variable component the value of which depends upon
the characteristics of each auditor’s clientele. This variable component is, in effect, a positive
network effect.
To find the conditions in which a network effect can arise we must first characterize the
investor’s stage 3 decision. After all, auditing is only valuable if the information that it creates
affects that decision. When vˆi = 0 or ei = ε, the investor knows that the true value of the
uncertain component of the return is 0, and the optimal decision for her is to finance the
alternative investment project y¯.The stage 3 decision faced by investor i is therefore non-trivial
only when the audit report confirms the information in the financial statement of the company
(that is, vˆi =θi) and the investor does not observe an audit error (ei = ∅).
Lets, then, consider the event in which vˆi = θi and ei = ∅. Define
γx ≡ Pr [vi = θi|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅;x] (2.3)
=
Pr [vˆi = θi, ei = ∅|vi = θi, x] Pr [vi = θi]
Pr [vˆi = θi, ei = ∅|x]
=
(1− q)
(1− q) + (1− x) (1− d) q .
The newly defined γx expresses the assessment that investor i would make, upon observing
vˆi = θi and ei = ∅, of the likelihood of the uncertain return to the company’s asset being θi
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if she could be sure that the auditor’s quality, da(i), was equal to x6. In stage 3, however,
the investor does not know what da(i) is equal to. Instead, she has a system of prior beliefs -
stipulating that da(i) is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] - and her observation of the auditor’s
performance in other companies (when the auditor is employed by companies with visibility).
So, let ρ
(
x|Pa(i)
)
denote investor i’s updated belief that the quality of company i’s auditor,
da(i), is equal to x; also let ρ|Pa(i) =
(
ρ
(
x|Pa(i)
))
x∈[0,1] denote a fully specified system of beliefs.
The investor decides to finance company i’s asset if she expects the return to that asset - of
which she would be the claimant - to be larger than the return to her outside opportunity:
E3
[
pii|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅,Pa(i)
]
=ˆ 1
0
θi Pr [vi = θi|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅;x] ρ
(
x|Pa(i)
)
∂x+ Li = (2.4)
θi
ˆ 1
0
γxρ
(
x|Pa(i)
)
∂x+ Li ≥ p¯i.
Expression (2.4) makes clear that the investor’s expectation regarding the return to com-
pany i’s asset depends upon her beliefs about the auditor’s ability. For the value derived
by the investor from the appointment of a particular auditor to have a variable component
that depends upon the characteristics of the auditor’s clientele, however, it is not enough that
E3
[
pii|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅,Pa(i)
]
depend upon Pa(i); it is also necessary that these beliefs be piv-
otal in the investor’s selection of an investment7. Otherwise - that is, if the investor always
choose the same investment regardless of observed performance Pa(i) - such information would
be worthless and only the audit report would matter. Beliefs are pivotal if the following two
assumptions hold:
A2 : θiγ0 + Li < p¯i
A3: θiγ1 + Li > p¯i
6γx is found by using Bayes’ rule.
7That is, there must be some updated beliefs for which the stockholder decides to finance the company, and
other beliefs for which she decides to finance her alternative opportunity.
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Assumption A2 (A3) states that when the investor is sure that the auditor’s ability is 0 (1),
she prefers the to finance the company (the alternative opportunity).
Letting ρ ≡ [ρ (x)]x∈[0,1] denote a system of updated beliefs, define the set
Φ = {ρ : E3 [pii|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅, ρ] + Li ≥ p¯i} .
Φ contains every belief system under which the investor prefers to invest in the company
rather than in the outside opportunity. It follows directly from assumption A3 that this set
is non-empty, and from assumption A2 that its complement is non-empty as well. The two
assumptions also imply that there is a threshold δ? such that, when the investor is sure that the
auditor’s ability to detect misstatements is equal to δ?, she is indifferent between financing the
company and the alternative opportunity. Lemma formally states this conclusion and presents
an expression for the threshold. The belief system prescribing ρ
(
δ?|Pa(i)
)
= 1 is in set Φ by
definition.
Lemma 8. Under assumptions A2 and A3, there is a threshold 0 < δ? < 1 such that if investor
i knew that da(i) = δ?, she would be indifferent between financing i and y¯ when vˆi = θi and
ei = ∅. That threshold is given by expression
δ? = 1− 1
q (1− d)
[
(1− q) (θi + Li − p¯i)
p¯i − Li
]
.
Proof. Because A2 and A3 both hold, the intermediate value theorem then implies that δ?
must exist. By definition, δ? solves the equation
E3 [pii|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅, δ?] = p¯i
⇔ (1− q)
(1− q) + (1− δ?) (1− d) q θi + Li = p¯i,
which, after solving for δ, yields the expression presented in the lemma.
Assumption A2 has one final implication of interest, summarized in lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Under assumption A2, if company i does not have an auditor (a (i) = ∅), then the
investor will not finance the company. That is, if a (i) = ∅, then yi = y¯.
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Proof. If company i does not have an auditor, then no information is generated. The investor’s
expectation of the value of the company’s return in the decision stage - stage 3 - is then
E3 (pii) = E0 (pii) = (1− q) θi + Li; since there is no audit fee, this is the investor’s expected
utility if she finances company i.
Assumption A2 states that θiγ0 +Li < p¯i. By evaluating expression (2.3) at 0 we find that
γ0 =
(1− q)
(1− q) + (1− d) q
which implies that γ0 > (1− q). We then have that
E3 (pii) = (1− q) θi + Li < θiγ0 + Li < p¯i,
where the last inequality follows from assumption A2. This inequality shows that the expected
return to financing the company is smaller than the return to the alternative opportunity,
which implies that the investor is better off pursuing the latter.
The reason why the investor does not finance the company when there is no auditor is the
following: by assumption A2, if the investor knows the auditor to be the worst possible, she
does not invest in the company even if she observes a positive audit report and no audit error;
however, even that worst possible auditor allows the investor to collect more information than
no auditor at all, so it follows that she cannot invest in that case either.
Lemma 9 completes the characterization of the investor’s optimal decision rule. The investor
finances company i if she observes an audit report vˆi = θi, no audit error ei = ∅, and her
updated beliefs are optimistic enough (ρ|Pa(i) ∈ Φ). She does not finance the company if any
of these conditions fails or if there is no auditor in place. Denoting by y?i the investor’s optimal
decision, we have that:
y?i =

y¯ if a (i) = ∅
y¯ if vˆi = 0; or ei = ε; or ρ|Pa(i) /∈ Φ
i if vˆi = θi, ei = ∅ and ρ|Pa(i) ∈ Φ
(2.5)
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vi Outcome Pr [vi, outcome|da] y?i pii|yˆi, a (i)
0 vˆi = 0 qda y¯ p¯i
0 vˆi = θi, ei = ε q (1− da) d y¯ p¯i
0
vˆi = θi, ei = ∅ q (1− da) (1− d) Pr [ρ|Pa /∈ Φ|da] y¯ p¯iρ|Pa /∈ Φ
0
vˆi = θi, ei = ∅ q (1− da) (1− d) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] i Liρ|Pa ∈ Φ
θi
vˆi = θi, ei = ∅ (1− q) Pr [ρ|Pa /∈ Φ|da] y¯ p¯iρ|Pa /∈ Φ
θi
vˆi = θi, ei = ∅ (1− q) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] i θi + Liρ|Pa ∈ Φ
Table 2.2: Probability of and return to each outcome for a fixed auditor quality
It is now possible to compute the net expected benefit that accrues to investor i when some
auditor a is in place in company i, as defined in expression (2.2), contingent on the investor
following the optimal strategy y?i :
αi,a = E0 (pii|yˆi, a (i))− E0 (pii|yˆi, ∅) = E0 (pii|yˆi, a (i))− p¯i.
Table 2.2 is of use in the computation of E0 (pii|yˆi, a (i)). It identifies every possible outcome
leading up to the investor’s decision in stage 3, the probability of that outcome, the decision
made by the investor after each outcome, and the return that follows from that decision, all for
a fixed auditor ability of da. The value of αi,a that results from adding the returns weighted
by their probability, integrating over the quality of the auditor (which is uniformly distributed
over [0, 1] and therefore has a density of 1 at all values in its support), and performing some
algebraic simplifications is:
αi,a =
ˆ δ?
0
(Li − p¯i) q (1− da) (1− d) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] ∂da
+
ˆ 1
δ?
(Li − p¯i) q (1− da) (1− d) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] ∂da
+
ˆ δ?
0
(θi + Li − p¯i) (1− q) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] ∂da (2.6)
+
ˆ 1
δ?
(θi + Li − p¯i) (1− q) Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] ∂da.
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Expression (2.6) highlights the crucial insight that, from an ex-ante perspective, the investor
gains if she can reduce the probability that she will hold misleading beliefs about the auditor’s
ability8. That is, αi,a is larger the higher Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] for all da > δ? is and the smaller
Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] for all da < δ?. It follows that the largest benefit that an investor may derive
from auditing is given by:
αmaxi,a =
ˆ 1
δ?
(Li − p¯i) q (1− da) (1− d) ∂da +
ˆ 1
δ?
(θi + Li − p¯i) (1− q) ∂da
=
(δ? − 1)2
2
q (1− d) (Li − p¯i) + (1− δ?) (1− q) (θi + Li − p¯i) .
which, using the value of δ? presented in lemma 8, simplifies to
αmaxi,a =
(1− q)2 (θi + Li − p¯i)2
2q (1− d) (p¯i − Li)
If company i has an auditor that has a numerous and visible set of clients - that is, an auditor
for which there is a large, informative, sample of performance observations - the likelihood that
the executive will have misleading beliefs is small. Herein lays the explanation as to why the
value associated to appointing an auditor a, given by αi,a, embeds a network effect.
Does auditing have a value even if the auditor has no other visible clients that can generate
informative observations about the auditor’s performance? Lemma 10 provides an answer.
Lemma 10. Auditing has an intrinsic value to the investor in company i if, and only if, the
following inequality holds:
θi ≥
(1− q) + 12 (1− d) q
(1− q) (p¯i − Li) .
Proof. When the company is audited by an auditor a′ that has I¯a,−i = 0 clients of high visibility
(not including i), the investor finances it after observing an audit report vˆi = θi and no audit
8The investor holds misleading beliefs whenever the investor’s observation of the auditor’s performance in
other companies, Pa, leads her to choose the alternative y¯ when the auditor’s true ability is in fact greater than
δ? or to finance i whenever the auditor’s true ability is smaller than δ?.
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error ei = ∅ if and only if:
E3 [vi|vˆi = θi, ei = ∅] + Li ≥ p¯i ⇔
(1− q)
(1− q) + 12 (1− d) q
θi + Li ≥ p¯i ⇔
θi ≥
(1− q) + 12 (1− d) q
(1− q) (p¯i − Li)
From hereon after, I will assume that auditing does indeed have an intrinsic value:
A4: θi ≥
(1− q) + 12 (1− d) q
(1− q) (p¯i − Li) , ∀i.
With assumption A4, I have fully formalized this paper’s model of audit value. Its main
tenets are the following. The model begins by assuming that auditing reduces the uncertainty
regarding the company’s asset. By assumption A4, this reduction in uncertainty is important
enough to make auditing by any auditor valuable from an ex-ante perspective. Put differ-
ently, auditing improves the decision-making of the investor. By assumptions A2 and A3, this
decision-making is further improved if the investor can reduce the uncertainty about the audi-
tor’s quality. The investor can achieve such a reduction in uncertainty if the company retains
an auditor about which there are (in stage 2) many informative observations of performance.
That is, if the company retains an auditor with many visible clients. The next subsection
explains exactly how the value derived by investor i from appointing some auditor a is affected
by the number of clients of the auditor and the visibility of those clients.
2.3.3 Belief formation and network effects in the value for financial audits
The purpose of this subsection is to give an analysis of the benefit function αi,a and, in particu-
lar, of its dependence upon the composition of auditor a’s client portfolio Υa. This dependence
exists because the investor derives value from having precise beliefs about the auditor’s ability.
It is therefore important to understand how updated beliefs are formed, and how their precision
is affected by the characteristics of Υa.
63
As mentioned in the previous subsection, investor i updates her beliefs about her auditor,
a (i) by observing the auditor’s performance in its I¯a(i),−i high visibility clients, that is, all
j ∈ Υa(i) such that σj = σ¯. It follows that, whatever network benefit investor i derives from
being audited by auditor a (i) is created by the I¯a(i),−i high visibility clients of that auditor.I
reflect this dependence of αi,a upon I¯a,−i by denoting it as αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
.
Given that the probability that an audit error is made public is the same for all high visibility
clients, all that matters to investor i is the count in Pa of the two possible public outcomes:
∅ and εp. As before, let company i’s auditor be a (i) = a. Then, let Na,−i be the number of
clients of that auditor, excluding i, for which a public audit error is observed. Formally, we
have Na,−i ≡ # {εp ∈ Pa}. The probability Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] that enters the investor’s benefit
from auditing is then the probability that Na,−i is low enough relative to I¯a,−i such that the
investor chooses to finance the company, given da. Conditional on da, Na,−i follows a binomial
distribution with I¯a,−i trials and probability Q ≡ Pr
[
epj = ε
p|da
]
= q (1− da) dσ¯ of “success”:
Na,−i|da ∼ Bin
(
I¯a,−i, Q
)
.
where Q is a random variable uniformly distributed over interval [0, qdσ¯], with density g (Q) =
1
qdσ¯ , mean E (Q) =
1
2qdσ¯, and variance V ar (Q) =
1
12 (qdσ¯)
29. Lemma 11 explains how the
investor updates her beliefs about Q - and, by extension, about da - given the observation of
the binomially distributed random variable Na,−i.
Lemma 11. When auditor a has I¯a,−i high visibility clients and it commits a public audit
error in Na,−i of them, investor i’s updated beliefs about Q = q (1− da) dσ¯ are given, for all
Q ∈ [0, qdσ¯], by the probability density function:
gˆ
(
Q|Na,−i; I¯a,−i
)
=
QNa,−i (1−Q)I¯a,−i−Na,−i´ qdσ¯
0 x
Na,−i (1− x)I¯a,−i−Na,−i ∂x
.
9da(i) is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], which implies that so is
(
1− da(i)
)
. Q is a linear transformation of(
1− da(i)
)
, and therefore it is uniformly distributed as well.
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The investor’s updated beliefs about the auditor’s ability da are given by
ρ (da|Pa) = gˆ
(
q (1− da) dσ¯|Na,−i; I¯a,−i
)
.
Proof. Investor i uses her observation of Na,−i to update her beliefs by using Bayes’ rule:
gˆ
(
Q|Na,−i; I¯a,−i
)
=
Pr
[
Na,−i|Q; I¯a,−i
]
g (Q)
Pr
[
Na,−i|I¯a,−i
] ,
where the conditional probability function of Na,−i is given by:
Pr
[
Na,−i|Q, I¯a,−i
]
=
(
I¯a,−i
Na,−i
)
QNa,−i (1−Q)I¯a,−i−Na,−i .
Using the fact that g (Q) = 1qdσ¯ we then have:
gˆ
(
Q|Na,−i; I¯a,−i
)
=
( I¯a,−i
Na,−i
)
QNa,−i (1−Q)I¯a,−i−Na,−i 1qdσ¯´ qdσ¯
0
( I¯a,−i
Na,−i
)
xNa,−i (1− x)I¯a,−i−Na,−i 1qdσ¯∂x
=
QNa,−i (1−Q)I¯a,−i−Na,−i´ qdσ¯
0 x
Na,−i (1− x)I¯a,−i−Na,−i ∂x
.
ρ (da|Pa) = gˆ
(
q (1− da) dσ¯|Na,−i; I¯a,−i
)
follows from the fact that Q = q (1− da) dσ¯.
The posterior beliefs presented in the lemma are single peaked. They are also more precise
the larger I¯a,−i is. However, precision increases at a decreasing rate, as the addition of obser-
vations of the auditor’s performance means that each observation has a smaller weight in the
investor’s formation of updated beliefs. This has an important implication: as I¯a,−i increases,
the probability Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] for da > δ? must eventually increase, while the probability
Pr [ρ|Pa ∈ Φ|da] for da < δ? must eventually decrease. In other words, the benefit that the
investor derives from being audited by auditor a must eventually increase at a decreasing rate
with the size of the auditor’s visible clientele. The qualifier “eventually” is necessary because,
for small I¯a,−i, the benefit from being audited by a may be constant. Proposition 7 establishes
this formally.
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Proposition 7. There is a threshold T ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} such that investor i’s benefit from retain-
ing an auditor a, αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
, is:
1. a constant α¯ if auditor a has any number I¯a,−i ≤ T of high visibility clients, not including
i;
2. increasing at a decreasing rate if auditor a has any number I¯a,−i > T of high visibility
clients, not including i.
For some parametrizations of the model, the threshold T is strictly greater than 0.
Proof. The proposition contains two claims:
1. There is a threshold T ∈ {1, 2, ...} such that αi,a
(
I¯
)
= α¯ if I¯a,−i = I¯ ≤ T and αi,a
(
I¯
)
is
increasing at a decreasing rate if I¯a,−i = I¯ > T .
The novel part of this claim is that for small clienteles, αi,a
(
I¯
)
= α¯, which is trivially
true for T = 0.
2. For some parametrizations of the model, the threshold T is strictly greater than 0.
By assumption A4, investor i finds it profitable to hire an auditor a′ that has no other
highly visible clients. That is the case because the parameters of the model are assumed
to be such that she finds it profitable to finance the company if a positive audit report
vˆi = θi is not contradicted by the observation of an audit error. It is then possible that
if investor i instead had an auditor a′′ such that I¯a′′,−i = 1, she might opt to finance the
company after observing vˆi = θi and ei = ∅ even if she observes a public audit error in
the other client of a′′. That is, it could be that ρ|Pa′′ ∈ Φ even if Pa′′ = {εp}, which is the
scenario in which the updated beliefs would be the most pessimistic. In this case, having
auditor a′′ audit the company instead of a′brings no additional benefit to the investor
which means that αi,a (1) = αi,a (0) = α¯ and, thus, that T > 0.
Figure 2.2 illustrates αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
for T = 3 andα¯ = 1. The figure captures the essential
features of the benefit from auditing: it may be fixed when a new high visibility client is added
to the auditor’s portfolio if that portfolio contains few highly visible clients; and it increases
at a decreasing rate when a new high visibility client is added to the auditor’s portfolio if the
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Figure 2.2: A representation of αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
with T = 3 and α¯ = 1.
portfolio contains sufficiently many highly visible clients.
Proposition 7’s characterization of audit value as a function of the auditor’s clientele gives
us a theory of the demand for audit services. The next section proposes a theory of audit
supply and characterizes the audit market equilibria that arise under the proposed theories of
demand and supply.
2.4 A model of the financial audit market
2.4.1 Audit supply: free entry and diseconomies of scale
This paper’s model of audit supply has two main tenets. The first is that there are no barriers
to entry in the industry and, therefore, that entry is free. The second is that auditors face
diseconomies of scale. With Ia denoting the number of clients in auditor a’s client portfolio
Υa, the cost function of auditor a is given by
C (Ia) = cI
2
a .
Note that the cost function faced by auditors implicitly assumes that client companies are
homogenous as far as audit technology goes: what determines the marginal cost of auditing a
client company is the number of companies that the auditor has, not any idiosyncratic feature
of the client. Diseconomies of scale play a crucial role in this model: they provide a natural -
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that is, non-regulatory - boundary to the size of auditors.
The assumption of diseconomies of scale is rooted in the hypothesis that increasing the
size of the auditor increases bureaucratic and monitoring costs. In reality, auditing firms may
benefit from economies of scale when the number of clients that they serve is low: an audit
firm may increase its portfolio of clients moderately without having to expand office space, hire
more back office staff or implement complex internal monitoring and control mechanisms. It is
only as they keep expanding that audit firms are likely to experience the rising marginal costs
that appear in association with the need for increased delegation. For simplicity of analysis,
the model assumes that diseconomies of scale start at the lowest auditor size (Ia = 2).
Subsection 2.4.3 explains how diseconomies of scale and the network effects in the value of
audits shape market equilibria. First, I must explain how market interaction is modeled.
2.4.2 The audit market: stage 0
The demand for financial auditing services comes from the I companies in the market. Each
company’s investor appoints the auditor and is responsible for the payment of the audit fees.
The underlying hypothesis is that, even if investors (or stockholders) do not actually directly
appoint the external auditor of the company, their preferences are heeded by the board and the
audit committee10. In the context of the model, each investor cares about only two variables:
the size of the auditor’s portfolio of visible clients and the audit fee.
The model of audit value presented in section 2.3 unfolded over stages 1 − 4 under the
assumption that an auditor had been appointed. The auditor is actually appointed when the
market meets in stage 0. The timing of stage 0 market interaction, exemplified in figure 2.3 for
a market with four clients, is the following: each auditor simultaneously submits private audit
fee proposals to a subset of its choice of the prospective client set {1, 2, ..., I}. The fee proposal
of auditor a to investor i is the previously introduced Fi,a, and cannot be made contingent upon
the audit outcome. Each investor then appoints at most one auditor from the list of auditors
10In the United Kingdom, auditors are appointed at the shareholders’ annual general meeting; in the U.S.,
the audit committee - which draws its members from the board of directors - oversees the hiring of the ex-
ternal auditor; in the European Union, the auditor is recommended by the audit committee - which contains
a combination of non-executive members of the board and members appointed by the shareholders’ general
meeting.
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Auditors a, a’ and a” 
simultaneously submit  
private audit fee 
proposals to subsets of 
{i,j,k,l}
Prospective clients i, j, 
k, and l simultaneously 
select auditors (lines 
denote alternatives, red 
denotes selection)
Figure 2.3: Example of market with prospective clients {i, j, k, l} and three proposing auditors
{a, a′, a′′}.
that made a proposal to audit her company. Investors appoint auditors simultaneously. If
investor i chooses auditor a, she pays the proposed fee Fi,a. Once investors appoint auditors,
every investor observes the client portfolio Υa of every auditor a.
The model of market interaction reflects the facts that audit firms are free to deny service to
clients by not extending offers and, more importantly, that they are free to price discriminate.
2.4.3 Equilibrium in the market for financial audits
This subsection brings together the models of audit demand, supply, and market interaction
previously developed. The model of audit value developed over 2.3 established that the benefit
enjoyed by an investor from appointing an auditor a is a function αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
that depends upon
the number of highly visible clients of the auditor. The benefit is flat up to a critical threshold
T and increasing but “concave” after that threshold. The model of audit supply developed in
subsection 2.4.1 proposed that the industry is characterized by free entry and diseconomies of
scale.
In light of this characterization, stage 0 interaction fits a model of network externalities
whereby: i) network benefits increase at a decreasing rate with the number of visible users of
the network (those j such that σj = σ¯) and do not change with the number of non-visible
users; ii) the cost function of the provider of the network good is convex in the total number of
users and given by C (Ia) = cI2a ; iii) the provider is allowed to discriminate while setting prices
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- that is, it can charge different fees to different clients.
Stage 0 can be interpreted as a standalone two period dynamic game in which auditors
maximize audit fees net of audit costs and each investor i maximizes αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
: in the first
period, auditors simultaneously submit (private) audit fee proposals to the stockholders of
client companies - with each auditor being free to submit proposals to as many clients as it
wishes; in the second, the investors simultaneously select one auditor each - or none - from
among the auditors that made them a proposal.
The baseline solution concept of the 5 stage model (0− 5) is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE), which is consistent with the investors’ Bayesian updating of beliefs regarding auditor
quality in stage 3. PBE requires sequential rationality in every contingency. For the investors,
this means that:
Eq1. each investor holds correct beliefs about the equilibrium portfolio of clients Υa that each
auditor a will end up with.
Eq2. in light of those beliefs, each investor chooses the auditor from which she derives the
most utility net of the audit fee. That is, given the audit proposals that she receives,
investor i accepts a proposal from which she cannot unilaterally deviate with profit.
For auditors, sequential rationality means that:
Eq3. each auditor holds correct beliefs about the equilibrium portfolio of clients Υa that each
auditor a will end up with.
Eq4. each auditor a charges each of its clients a fee that makes them indifferent between
appointing a and the next best alternative (another auditor or no auditor).
Eq5. no auditor can profit by making an audit proposal that “poaches” a client that appoints
a different auditor on the equilibrium path. This condition includes a no profitable entry
condition, whereby no audit firm without clients on the proposed equilibrium path can
profitably poach a client.
Eq6. no auditor can profit by not making a proposal that the other players expect it to.
If the cost parameter c is sufficiently large, the model has a unique equilibrium whereby compa-
nies do not audit any clients. If, on the other hand, c is small, there can be multiple equilibria.
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In particular, there can be “bad” equilibria reflecting dis-coordination between the players when
T ≥ 2. Lemma 12 formalizes this result and its proof conveys the intuition as to why this is
the case.
Lemma 12. Consider a parametrization of the model whereby network effects appear only when
an auditor has more than two clients (T = 2). Let that parametrization be such that it has at
least one equilibrium in which at least one auditor has more than one client. Then, the model
also has an equilibrium whereby each company is audited by an auditor without any other clients
and is charged an audit fee equal to c.
Proof. Consider a proposed equilibrium outcome in which each client is indeed audited by an
auditor without any other clients and charged an audit fee equal to c (equilibrium cannot be
sustained in this case if the fee is greater than c because of free entry). Since investors expect the
proposed equilibrium to be played out, they believe that each auditor will end up with exactly
one or zero clients, and they will judge deviation offers by any of these auditors accordingly.
So consider a proposed deviation by an auditor a that has one client on the equilibrium path.
Since every investor expects a to have exactly one client (investor beliefs are formed according
to the proposed equilibrium path) and network effects appear only when an auditor has more
than two clients (T = 2), investors receiving a deviation proposal by a assign the same value
to appointing a as they do to appointing their equilibrium path auditor. It follows that the
deviation proposal is profitable to the investors receiving it only if the deviation fee is smaller
than their equilibrium path fee of c. Auditor a, however, cannot profitably offer such deviation
fee as the marginal cost of auditing the second client is c22 − c12 = 3c.
Now consider an auditor that has no clients on the equilibrium path: it is also unable to
create network benefits to investors, and cannot rationally offer a fee strictly lower than c. The
lack of profitable deviations shows that the proposed equilibrium is an equilibrium indeed.
The inefficient equilibria characterized in the lemma rely on investors not being able to
coordinate their choice of auditor in order to generate the positive network effect of more
precise beliefs. To discard these equilibria, I limit the analysis from hereon after to the class
of equilibria that are efficient from a social welfare standpoint.
Let an outcome in the audit market be an allocation of clients to auditors Υ = (Υa)a:Ia>0 -
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which is a partition of the client set {1, ..., I} - and a schedule of audit fees F =
[
(Fj,a)j∈Υa
]
a:Ia>0
.
Definition 2 lays out the conditions that outcome (Υ, F ) must fulfill to be supported in an ef-
ficient equilibrium.
Definition 2. A strategy profile yielding an outcome (Υ, F ) is an efficient equilibrium if it
maximizes the welfare function
W (Υ) =
∑
a:Ia>0
[∑
i∈Υa
αj,a
(
I¯a,−j
)− cI2a
]
subject to fulfilling equilibrium conditions Eq1-6.
The definition makes clear that, as long as c is not too large, efficiency requires network
externalities to be generated and hence discards the “one client per auditor” scenario. Two
remarks are now pertinent. The first remark concerns the size that auditors may take. The
welfare generated by auditor a is defined as:
Wa (Υa) ≡
∑
i∈Υa
αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)− cI2a . (2.7)
Given the characteristics of the benefit function αi,a (·), it must be that the welfare generated by
auditor a, Wa (Υa), becomes decreasing in the number of clients after some number of clients is
reached, even if all clients have high visibility: when a client j with high visibility is added to a’s
portfolio, each of the other clients derives a marginal externality of αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)−αi,a (I¯a,−i − 1),
whereas j derives a benefit αj,a
(
I¯a,−j
)
. The externality is bounded above and goes to zero as
the number of high visibility clients I¯a increases, which means that for high I¯a, the benefit of
adding a new client approaches a constant αj,a
(
I¯a,−j
)
. The convexity of the cost function then
implies that Wa (Υa) becomes decreasing at some point. It follows that the size of an auditor’s
portfolio has a well defined upper boundary in an efficient equilibrium: the biggest size before
the welfare generated by a starts decreasing.
The second remark concerns audit fees and is summarized in proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Let company i be audited by auditor a. Then, i’s audit fee must be such that:
c (2Ia − 1) ≤ Fi,a ≤ αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)− αi,a (0) + c (2.8)
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Proof. For equilibrium condition Eq6 to hold, audit fees must be larger than the “marginal”
cost of auditing the last client. That is, for every auditor a and every client i ∈ {1, ..., I}, it
must be that:
Fi,a ≥ cI2a − c (Ia − 1)2 = c (2Ia − 1) .
For equilibrium condition Eq5 to hold, no auditor without other clients may profit by
making an audit proposal to i that she would prefer over the proposal of a. An auditor without
clients on the equilibrium path profits if she can convince any client i to pay a fee c + , for
an arbitrarily small  . Under such auditor, i would obtain a benefit αi,a (0) and no network
externalities. Therefore, it must be that:
αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)− Fi,a > αi,a (0)− c− ⇔
Fi,a < αi,a
(
I¯a,−i
)
+ c+ .
Proposition 8 has an important implication: every auditor with more than one client has
a positive economic profit. Moreover, the lower bound for profits is bigger for companies with
larger client portfolios. On the other hand, if in equilibrium there are auditors with only one
client, they earn a profit of zero.
The two sub-subsections that follow conclude the characterization of market outcomes in
efficient equilibria. Each addresses a different parametrization of the model: in the first,
client companies have heterogeneous returns (θi, Li) and homogenous σi; in the second, client
companies have homogenous θi and heterogeneous σi. The equilibria of the parametrizations
are interpreted in light of the stylized facts that motivate this paper: the patterns of market
concentration across segments of the audit market. The sources of heterogeneity are considered
in isolation rather than in tandem for tractability.
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2.4.4 Equilibrium with homogenous visibility and heterogeneous informational
asymmetries
This subsection analyzes the case in which companies all have high visibility (σi = σ¯ for all
i ∈ {1, ..., I}, or I¯ = I), but differ in terms of the parameters (θi, Li) of their returns. In
particular, this section assumes that companies may have one of two alternative parameter
pairs,
(
θ¯, L¯
)
or (θ, L), such that θ¯ > θ and
(1− q) θ¯ + L¯ = (1− q) θ + L
which combined imply that L¯ < L . It follows that, while the expected return is the same for
all companies, any company i such that θi = θ¯ sees a larger share of its return come from the
uncertain component, whereas any company j such that θi = θ sees a larger share of its return
come from the certain component. We have, then, that the case under consideration in this
section is one in which companies exhibit heterogeneous informational asymmetry between
managers and investors. In companies with parameter pair
(
θ¯, L¯
)
, the asymmetry is more
severe.
From expression (2.6) it is clear that companies where informational asymmetries are more
severe benefit more from auditing and from the network benefits generated by the auditor
than companies where those asymmetries are less severe. The interpretation for this positive
correlation between information asymmetries and audit value is intuitive: the larger θi is, the
more damaging an undetected audit error becomes. Translating the meaning of this positive
correlation into the language of models of network externalities, we have that the network users
differ in the value that they assign to the network good.
Proposition 9 provides a first condition that an outcome must satisfy to be supported in an
efficient equilibrium when the audit clients differ in their valuation of auditing. It asserts that in
a audit market defined by the heterogeneity of clients in terms of the information asymmetries,
an auditor with a large client portfolio necessarily has more clients with severe informational
asymmetries than a smaller auditor.
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Proposition 9. In any efficient equilibrium of the case in which companies exhibit hetero-
geneous asymmetric information between managers and investors, if an auditor a′ has more
clients than another auditor a′′, then it must have more clients with severe informational asym-
metries. That is,
Ia′ > Ia′′ ⇒ #
{
i ∈ Υa′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
> #
{
i ∈ Υa′′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
.
Proof. Suppose instead that we had Ia′ > Ia′′ and
#
{
i ∈ Υa′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)} ≤ #{i ∈ Υa′′ : (θi, Li) = (θ¯, L¯)}
in an efficient equilibrium. That is, suppose that auditor a′ had more clients than a′′, but
that a′′ had at least as many clients with severe informational asymmetries. Then, a welfare
improvement is available. The improvement consists of “swapping” one of the clients of a′′
with severe asymmetries to a′ for one of a′’s clients with mild asymmetries. The swap does
not change the cost of either company and allocates a client that values the network effects
more to an auditor were these effects are stronger. Since the original outcome was supported in
equilibrium, the new one must be supported as well: just have the clients that swapped auditors
pay the fees that their respective counterparts would have paid. Because the new outcome can
be supported in a PBE and improves welfare, we have a contradiction of the assertion that the
initial outcome was supported in an efficient equilibrium.
By a similar argument, auditor a′ has at least as many clients as a′′ if it has more clients
with severe informational asymmetries11. That is,
#
{
i ∈ Υa′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
> #
{
i ∈ Υa′′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}⇒ Ia′ ≥ Ia′′ .
Proposition 10 provides a second condition that an outcome must satisfy to be supported
11The proof is the same as that of proposition 9: it starts by assuming #
{
i ∈ Υa′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
>
#
{
i ∈ Υa′′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
and proceeds through a contradiction argument whereby it supposes, for the
sake of that argument, that Ia′ < Ia′′ . The swap argument presented in proposition 9 then applies, which
results in the demonstration of the desired contradiction.
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in an efficient equilibrium. The proposition establishes that if an auditor a′ has clients of both
types, then it cannot happen that an audit client with severe informational asymmetries has
an auditor with fewer clients than a′.
Proposition 10. Let auditor a′ have clients of both types of information asymmetries in its
client portfolio. Then, there cannot exist an auditor a′′ that has any clients with severe infor-
mational asymmetries and that has strictly fewer clients than a′. That is, a′ is the smallest
auditor with clients with severe informational asymmetries.
Proof. Suppose instead that an auditor a′′ existed such that Ia′ > Ia′′ and
#
{
i ∈ Υa′′ : (θi, Li) =
(
θ¯, L¯
)}
> 0.
Then, a welfare improvement is available. The improvement consists of “swapping” one of the
clients of a′′ with severe asymmetries to a′ for one of a′’s clients with mild asymmetries. The
swap does not change the cost of either company and allocates a client that values the network
effects more to an auditor were these effects are stronger. Since the original outcome was
supported in equilibrium, the new one must be supported as well: just have the clients that
swapped auditors pay the fees that their respective counterparts would have paid. Because the
new outcome can be supported in a PBE and improves welfare, we have a contradiction of the
assertion that the initial outcome was supported in an efficient equilibrium.
Combined, the two propositions imply that, in any efficient equilibrium, every company with
severe informational asymmetries is audited by one of the largest auditors, which is consistent
with the stylized fact that large auditors, namely the Big 4, audit most publicly listed compa-
nies and most large companies. Moreover, if we assume that the model’s market for auditing
has fewer companies with severe informational asymmetries than companies with small agency
problems, we get the prediction that market concentration is stronger in the strong informa-
tional asymmetry segment. The assumption and the prediction are respectively compatible
with reality and the stylized facts that motivate this paper.
The relevant comparative statics in this section concern how changes in the parameters
measuring informational asymmetry affect the nature of efficient equilibria. We can use the
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statics to help answer at least one important question: how are markets where informational
asymmetries are stronger across the board structured? If both θ and θ¯ are larger, than the
set of efficient equilibria will remain the same or there will be new equilibria calling for fewer
auditors with more clients (as auditing is more valuable to everyone). The prediction is then
that geographic markets in which informational asymmetries are stronger - which might be
those where there are more large companies - are likely to be more concentrated.
2.4.5 Equilibrium with heterogeneous visibility and homogenous informational
asymmetries
This subsection analyzes the case in which companies have homogenous informational asymme-
tries but differ in terms of their visibility. That is, the case in which I¯ < I and (θi, Li) = (θ, L)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., I}. As a reminder, note that there are I¯ with high visibility σ¯ and I − I¯ with
no visibility. Visibility determines whether audit errors detected within a company can ever be
public knowledge and, therefore, whether a company generates a network externality for the
other companies that are audited by that company’s auditor.
Translating the new parametrization into the language of models of network externalities,
we now have that all network users assign the same value to the network good, but only a few of
them (the I¯ companies with high visibility) are desirable as co-users of a network. Proposition
11 establishes that in a audit market defined by the heterogeneity of client visibility, larger
auditors cannot have fewer highly visible clients. This result, similar to that presented in
proposition 9 for the case of heterogeneous informational asymmetries, is again consistent with
the stylized fact that large auditors, namely the Big 4, audit most public and large companies.
Proposition 11. In any efficient equilibrium of the case in which companies exhibit heteroge-
neous visibility, auditor a′ has more clients than auditor a′′ only if it has at least as many high
visibility clients. That is,
Ia′ > Ia′′ ⇒ I¯a′ ≥ I¯a′′ .
Proof. Suppose instead that we had Ia′ > Ia′′ and I¯a′ < I¯a′′ . That is, suppose that auditor a′
had more clients, but that auditor a′′ had at least as many highly visible clients, which also
implies that auditor a′ has at least one client with no visibility. A welfare improvement is
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available. The improvement consists of moving one of auditor a′’s clients with no visibility, k,
to auditor a′′. Since Ia′ > Ia′′ , it follows that
[
c (Ia′ − 1)2 − cI2a′
]
−
[
c (Ia′′ + 1)
2 − cI2a′′
]
≥ 0.
In words, the cost savings of auditor a′ are larger than the increase in costs of auditor a′′. Since
k has no visibility, its exit does not reduce the network effects enjoyed by the other clients of
a′. And, finally, k enjoys a strictly larger network benefit when it joins auditor a′′. Because
the new outcome can be supported in a PBE and improves welfare, we have a contradiction of
the assertion that the initial outcome was supported in an efficient equilibrium.
By a similar argument, it follows that auditor a′ has at least as many clients as a′′ if it has
more clients with high visibility. That is:
I¯a′ > I¯a′′ ⇒ Ia′ ≥ Ia′′ .
In contrast to the previous sub-subsection, where the case of heterogeneous informational
asymmetries was treated, here it is not possible to establish that if an auditor has both types
of clients, it cannot happen that audit clients with high visibility appoint auditors with fewer
clients than that auditor. In fact, whereas in a market in which companies differ in the severity
of informational asymmetries it cannot be bad, from a social welfare standpoint, to have perfect
segregation according to that severity, here it can be bad to have segmentation according to
visibility. The reason is that only high visibility clients generate network externalities and,
hence, complete segmentation precludes low visibility clients from enjoying those externalities.
Complete segmentation might give rise to large auditors in which the marginal network value
of the last highly visible clients is very low relative to what their marginal network value would
be in a smaller auditor with a few low visibility clients. In sum, unless the diseconomies of
scale are very strong, in efficient equilibria big audit firms contain a mix of high visibility and
no visibility clients.
Because of diseconomies of scale, auditors that only audit no visibility clients must have
only one client. If we assume that the model’s market for auditing has relatively fewer highly
visible companies, we get the prediction that market concentration is stronger among the high
visibility market segment. Once again, the assumption and the prediction are compatible with
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reality and the stylized facts that motivate this paper. 
2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a micro-founded model of auditing demand in which clients benefit from
network effects. By using two different parametrizations of the model, the paper then suggests
two new explanations for the pattern of market concentration across segments in audit markets.
The paper also provides an explanation for the observation that large auditors charge higher
audit fees, and suggests that large auditors may enjoy positive economic profits. Naturally, the
paper’s theory would benefit from empirical study.
The line of research that this paper follows would also benefit from a formal approach to the
explanation of why the big auditors are, in almost every local market, autonomous subsidiaries
of the Big 4 audit firms.
The network effects approach followed here might also help explain the pattern of mergers
that transformed the Big 8 (1980s) into the Big 4 (2000s). Changes in the corporate en-
vironment, the increased dispersion of companies’ stocks - and the consequent deepening of
informational asymmetries - and financial innovation may have enhanced the value of auditing
and thus made larger audit firms viable. Mergers may have then been a way to capture the
new benefits from the existence of large auditors.
The network effects approach to the audit market might be adapted to answer new ques-
tions. The paper assumes throughout that client portfolios are determined simultaneously. A
dynamic approach would enable the investigation of the effects of incumbency in the audit
market. Another, perhaps less immediately obvious, question concerns market interaction in
new audit markets. This question is relevant for the analysis of audit markets in emerging
economies, in which the increase in size of companies, the development of financial markets,
and the introduction of financial regulations might create a new demand for audit services
where the supply is incipient. In these markets, established audit “brands” might have a first
mover advantage.
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